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Deregulation and liberalization of product, labor, and financial
markets - together with higher levels of investment and rapid
technological advances in industrial and services sectors -
should make the 1990s a period of rapid growth in the high-
income OECD countries and a number of leading developing
countries.  But the pattern of international financial flows is
likely to perpetuate two tracks of high and low growth in the de-
veloping world.
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Fardoust and Dhareshwar argue that, at the broad  Round of trade negotiations - may also act as
level of global analysis, there are good reasons to be  growth impulses in the 1990s.
optimistic about the 1990s. First, there are favorable
supply-side developments in many of the high-  In marked contrast to the generally upbeat
income countries.  Per capita real income growth rates  outlook for the developed world, the prospects are
in the 1990s are expected to be higher than in the  less certain for the developing regions, where
1980s: higher by about 0.5 percent per year for the  performance is more diverse.  The major sources cf
industrial countries, and higher by as much as I  uncertainty are the level and cost of financial flows
percent per year for developing countries, on average.  the developing countries can expect, the degree of
If there are no major policy mistakes and the interna-  their own success in implementing policy reforms and
tional financial markets remain reasonably stable, the  structural adjustments, and the strength of world trade
remarkable rebound in investment rates observed  and the extent of openness of the industrial-country
during the past few years should promote a period of  markets to developing-country exports.
relatively rapid and noninflationary growth in these
countries.  Second, considerable scope exists for a  Given the inevitability of economic shocks,
recovery of private consumption and investment in  adaptability and economic resilience will be essential
the debt-stricken developing countries, as well as in  for satisfactory performance of the developing
Eastern Europe and the USSR. Therefore, while  countries in the 1990s. With international prices and
concerns about financial volatility and about current  market structures changing radically, countries that
economic slowdown in some of the major industrial  lag behind in economic reform and in making the
countries cloud the world economic outlook in the  investments needed for growth are likely to suffer a
short run, the long-term prospects for the industrial  significant decline in their relative standards of living
and leading developing countries are quite favorable.  during the 1990s.
The 1990s will see a continuation of the process  According to Fardoust and Dhareshwar, the
of economic integration currently under way, encom-  expected pattern of international trade and investment
passing mainly the industrialized and the newly  flows in the 1990s is likely to perpetuate two tracks of
industrializing economies, propelled by rapid techno-  growth in the developing world. While growth may
logical progress and increased competition in interna-  be expected to be high in many Asian industrializing
tional markets, and taking place against a backdrop of  economies, relatively high population growth and low
policy reforms, economic restructuring, and political  private investment will probably continue to depress
liberalization that has been gathering momentum  living standards in many countries in Latin America
since the early 1980s. Several ongoing economic and  and Sub-Saharan Africa. The substantial differences
political events - principally Project 1992,  which  in investment rates of the 1980s between the higher-
aims for a deeper integration of the European Com-  income and other developing countries will, if not re-
munity, the ongoing changes in Eastem Europe and  versed, tend to widen the productivity and tLchnclogy
the USSR, and successful completion of the Uruguay  gap between them.
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Overvlew  of Issues and Global Projections
1.  INTRODUCTION  AND  SUMMARY
The state of global  development  in the 1990s  will  be greatly  influenced  by the economic  adjustment,  restructuring,
and market-oriented reforms that have been taking  place in many countries during  the 1980s. Thus the future
will differ from an extrapolation  of postwar  trends.  While a significant  number of countries could fall behind,
many should be able to benefit, depending mainly  on their own initiative,  and secondarily  on the evolution  of
global development strategy and effort.  This paper describes the likely winners and losers, tells why, and
concludes  by attompting  to delineate the challenge  for long-run  development  policy.
In the postwar  era, restoration of stability  was a leading objective;  many regulatory schemes were
introduced  by governments  to enhance economic,  social and political  stability. Although  stability  proved  to be
ctnducive to economic growth for two decades, over time the new policies brought about rigidities in the
functioning  of markets as well as rising inflation. These rigidities,  in turn, tended to impede private investment
and, thereby, economic  growth, with the result that during the 1970s  both growth and stability  suffered. The
1980s  witnessed  the beginnings  of reform, as poLitical  systems  began responding  to perceived  shortcomings.
These reforms are beginning  to show  some positive  results. Since the mid-1980s,  after several  years
of general weakness  in business  activity,  many  industrial  countries  and newly-industrializing  developing  economies
have begun to experience  a significant  increase  in private  investment  across  all economic  sectors. With the rise
in investment,  the pace of technological  progress and its diffusion  into the production  process have  become more
rapid, particularly  in the field of microelectronics,  and more recently in genetic engineering. In the industrial
countries,  the new generation of technologies  has brought about the introduction  of industrial  robots and a new
generation of machines  that are more efficient  to operate and allow  far more flexibility  in the production  process
than before. As a result, growth  rates of productivity  are beginning  to show some improvement  in a number of
major industrial countries, especially  when compared with the mediocre record of last 15 years.  Technical
progress and its diffusion  have also helped to generate a wide range of new products and processes,  which  are
being rapidly introduced in international markets. Among these products,  services are at least as dynamic  as
goods.2
The opportunities and challenges  presented by technical  progress and liberalizing  policies  in the
relatively  industrialized  economies  are stimulating  structural  reforms in some developing  countries and  a number
of centrally  planned economies. If successfully  implemented  on a sustainable  basis, these reforms should result
in a  more adaptable and resilient economy in ther:  coi ntries.  Given the inevitability  of economic shocks,
adaptability  will  be essential  for satisfactory  performance  Ini  the 1990s. International  prices  and market  structures
will  continue to change  radically  and, as regards detail end timing,  unpredictably. The countries  that lag behind
in  ntroducing  economic  reforms, fail to restructure and retool their industries,  and are unable to keep up their
investment in human capital and in the new process technologies  can be expected to suffer a relative, and
perhaps even an absolute, deterioration in their standard of living. 1
Looking  beyond  the financial  uncertainties  (mainly  due to the massive  external payments  imbalances
the major industrial  countries) clouding  the world  economic  outlook  in the shorter run, we see a number of
positive  factors that are likely  to lead to a higher non-inflationary  growth path than the world has enjoyed  since
the early 1970s. In the absence of  'ajor adverse  shock, the long-term  economic  prospects  for the industrial
countries and a number of leai  -mies in the developing  regions are quite favorable.  However,  the
pattern of international  financial  fl 'ws tudt is apt to accompany  this improved  global  trend will,  under presently-
foreseeable conditions,  leave a large number  low- and Mn;A'ie-income  countries on the sidelines,  essentially
marginalized  by dynamics  that favor the leaders.  T--ese -.  ntries may continue to find it difficult even to
maintain their present standards of living. Absent a sea-change  in the strategy and organization  of the global
development  effort and in their own domestic policies,  economic growth and productivity  increase in these
countries will be  impeded by high popuiation growth, especially  in Africa, and by an inadequate level of
investment,  which will probably continue to be depressed as long as the level of net financial  flows to these
countries remains adverss.
The problem of rectifying  this adversity  in development  finance goes beyond the current phase of
the "debt crisis" and extends  to demographic,  technological and environmental  factors which  will  influence  the
future allocation  of capital wd that may tend to perpetuate a "two-tracks" (high and low) growth pattem in the
v  For recent detailed studies  by Bank Staff on the effects of pulicy  reforms on the economic  performance  of
developing  countries, see The World Bank, Sub-Saharn Africa: From Crisis  to Sustainable  Growth,  l989, and
The World Bank, "Report on Adjustment Lending," Staff Study, 1988  (processed).3
world  economyY The analysis  and projections  that follow  reflect  an attempt to take these longer-term  influences
into account.
Summary of Main Issues
The predominant chrracteristic of the world economy  in the decade of the 1990s  is likely  to be a continuation
of the process of economic integration currently under way, encompassing  the industrialized  and the newly
industrializing  economies. The rapid pacc and wide-ranging  nature of the current wave  of ttchnological  change
and a higher level of competition  in international  markets are the major driving  forces  behind the trend toward
integration. In turn, the key underlying  factor that ties these trends together and that has proved  to be a major
impulse for them is the conjunction  of policy  reforms, economic  restructuring,  and political liberalization  that
have been gathering  momentum since the early 1980s  throughout the world.
Imhw1al CAmwu
In line with these developments,  the economic  performance  of the High-Income  OECD countries
is likely  to be markedly  better in the 1990s  than it has been in the 1980s. While they are not likely  to reach the
record growth rates set in the 1960s (the so-called  "golden age"), the High-Income  OECD countries should
experience an acceleration in the pace of productivity  and real income growth, on the assumption of stable
conditions  in the global  financial  markets. The average real income per capita for these countries is expected
to rise at an annual rate of 2.6 percent in the 1990s,  compared with 2.2  percent in the 1980s. The average  rate
of inflation is expected  to remain fairly low,  between 3 and 4 percent per year.
For the developing  countries  as a group, the prospects  for the 1990s  are more uncertain,  the major
sources of the uncertainty  being  the level and cost of financial  flows to the developing  countries; the degree of
success  of individual  countries in implementing  appropriate policy  reforms and structural adjustments;  and the
strength of world trade and the degree of openness  of the industrial-counL'y  markets to exports  from developing
countries.
2/  See The World Bank (IECAP), 'The  Developing  Countries and the Short-Term Outlook for the Global
Economy," January 1989  and June 1989  issues; and Louis  Emmerij (ed.) One World  or Several?,  OECD, Paris,
1989;  and in the same volume. Colin  Bradford, "The Problem Quantified."4
Although  the average  real income per capita of the developing  countries as a group couli rise by
as much a- 3 percent per year in the 1990s,  the figre,  while it is in line with the long-term trend, masks a
substantial  diversity  of performance  within  the broad group. For example,  the Asian NIEs are expected  to grow
at an annual raie of nearly 7 percent (5.5 percent per capita),  while Sub-Saharan  Africa is projected to grow at
an annual rate of about 4 percent (less than 1 percent per capita). These are nr+ trend projections  alone; the
disparity  in the expected growth performance  of these two groups is intimately  related to their differences  in
investment  outlay, human capital spending,  eternal  debt burden and population growth rates.
Many other developing  economies  could experience  markedly  faster growth in the I99Os  than they
did in the 1980s  if they are successful  in implementing  the policy  reforms and structural  adjustments  needed to
enhance their productive  efficiency.  But it will  be a doubly  formidable challenge. For one, because  of the debt
overhang,  many of these countries  may be forced to rely more  on domestic  savings  and foreign  direct investment
for  financing domestic investment projects, while they try, at  the same time, not to  lose access to  new
technologies. For another, a large number of these countries  are expectei to face a substantial  increase in their
labor supply in the 1990s  because of their relatively  high population growth.  Thus, these countries wiU  be
confronted with the task of raising the level of productivity,  while they must, at the same time, absorb the
increasing  additions to the labor force.
Reosm  for Optmim for  he  1991k
The major underlying  currents that account  for the overaU  hopefulness,  albeit a guarded and modest
one, about the prospects of the industrial  economies  in the 1990s  are:  the ongoing  attempts in a large number
of countries to introduce structural  reforms and to deregulate  and liberalize  their product, labor, and financial
markets; the rapid pace of technological  advance  with  widespread  application  for industrial  and service  sectors,
which,  together with higher levels of investment,  should result in a faster diffusion  of new technologies  and a
marked improvement  in productivity  performance;  important economic and political events, such as, Project
1992  for a deeper integration  of the European Community  and the major ongoing changes in Eastern Europe
and the USSR  with a high likelihood  of their integration  in the international  economy  to a considerable  degree;
and the significant  lowering  of trade barriers that could result from the successful  completion  of the ongoing
Uruguay  Round of trade negotiations.5
Reoas far Cnwcem
Two areas that present considerable  downside  risk to the prospects of the world economy  in the
199(K  are:  global financial  volatility that arises from, among other things, the massive external-payments
imbalances  of the major industrial  couutries and the uncertainties  about the environment. A crisis erupting in
either of these areas may well result in a sharp drop in the rate of economic  growth worldwide.
Past expericnce has shown that the potential for growth and prosperity offered by a  favorable
conaellation of events and factors  can be squandered  by the failure of policymakers  to recognize  the nature of
the risks and take steps to deal with them.  Policymakers  in the major industrial  countries could, through the
correct set of policies,  ensure gradual reduction  of the external-payments  imbalances  that currently  afflict thei,
economies. It was a financial  crisis that was responsible  for the depression of the 1930s  and for the economic
malaise of many developing  countries in the 1980s. It is imperative  to avoid major financial  crises.
It is difficult  to quantify  tuei  impact of changes  in environment  on the long-term growth prospects
of the world  economy  because of the complexity  of the issues and the fact that the nature of the linkages  are not
yet fully  understood, Nevertheless,  in this area policy  needs to be forward-looking  and farther-seeing  in order
to obviate disasters  that could prove to be much costlier than even a massive  financial  crisis.6
2.  OVERVIEW  OF MAJOR TRENDS  AND  KEY  DEVELOPMENT  ISSUES
2.1  Two Decades  of Structural Change In the World Ecenomy
During the past twenty-five  years, the world economy  has become far more interdependent than in any previous
period (Table 1). While  the growing  interdependence  has led to a dynamic  of economic  convergence  among  the
industrial  countries and some of the leading  developing  economies,  there has oeen a widening  of the income  gap
between the morc industrialized  countries and a large nuomber  of 4eve!oping  countries and an emergence of
increasing  diversity  of economic  structure and performance  withln the developing  regions.
By the end of the 1970s,  the a. cumulation  of structural rigidities  and internal as well as external
imbalances,  built up over the years mainly  on account of faulty  domestic  economic  policies,  had made a large
number of developing  economies  vulnerable  to large external shocks. Also, many developing  countries tended
to ignore the onge  ; structural shifts  in the world  economy. Therefore, when  the global  economic  enviromnent
deteriorated, particularly  in the firs 4 half of the 1980s,  many developing  economies  were hit hard. Sub-Saharan
Africa, a region that had already  been experiencing  econor&- lifficulties  since the mid-197ns  along with many
of the poorest developing  countries, suffered a major economic  se-back  in a relatively  short time span, as its
average  per capita income fell by 15  percent a-d its share in world output fell by more than 50 percent between
1980  and 1986. Also, the highly  indebted countries  - some of them among  the largest economies  in the middle-
income group - saw their share in world output decline  by 36 percent between 1980  and 1986.
In contrast, by the mid-1980s,  a few middle-income  countries (for example, Korea and Taiwan,
China) had, galvanized  by the rapid growth of their manufactures and exports sectors, emerged in the global
eAumomy  with substantial  industrial  capacity,  while a few other middle-income  countries (for example,  Malaysia
and Thailand)  have  also begun  to outperform  the rest of the developing  countries. If the present trends continue,
these countries  are expected  to join the high-income  group  within the next two decades. In fact one of the most
striking  features of the global  structural changes of the past two decades is the rapid rise of GDP and tade  ox
the Newly  Industrialing  Economies  in Asia relative to those of other developing  regionsc  and the high  income
OECD countries (Tables 2 and 3). The Asian  N£Es  raised their share of output, in the developing  regions  total,
from 2.5 percent in 1965 to almost 12 percent (1.8 percent of world GDP) in 1986,  while their share in
manufactures exports by developing countries rose from 18 percent to 55 percent (8.5 percent of world
manufactures  exports) during lhe sante period.7
TABLE  1.  ExpansIon  of World Trade and Finance
In Relation  to Economic  Activity 196547
(1peent)
Ratio to World GDPa/
1965  1973  1987
. percentage
International  Trade b/  119  13.9  18.0
Manufactures  S.8  8.0  11.0
Rawmateuialsc/  2.0  1.6  13
Intemnational Banking  d/
Grmosmarket  size  IS  6.2  29A
Net market size  0.9  3.7  17.0
Value added in wodd service  sector  49.0  55.0  59.0
metric  ton per bil.  dollar
Memuaaem:  ,  of rem  output
World Consumption  (to GDP ratio) e/
Minerals  and metals fl (excluding  iron)  4.0  3.0  2.8
Iron-oe  (metal  content) gl  51.5  425  33.0
Oil  /  287.0  345.0  2365
Sm;  IECAP Diision, International  Economics  Department;  some of the cakulations
are based on World Bank, Eiie  PEM=  fn  Mij  EdmayCnmmad"  Report No.
814/88,  Nov.  1988;  Morgan Guaranty  Trust Company,  World  Vevarious  is.
sues;  and  Ralph  Btyant,  Zntceaba nanmci  alJntem  aign.  Brookinge,  1987.
a/  World  GDP, excluding  Soviet  Union and Eastern Europe  in current prices  and dolar
exchange  rates.
b/  World Exports  of goods and services,  excluding  Suviet  Union  and Eastern Europe.
c/  Excluding  fuels
d/  Morgan Guaranty  series are used to estimate  the size  of the international bank crediL
Net market sie excludes  interbank  caims.
e/  Approximate  measures Metric  tons  per biDion  dolar of world  real GDP (in 1980
pries  and dollar  exchange  rates). Eastern Europe  and USSR are not included.
f/  Apparent consumption  of aluminum,  copper,  lead, nickel,  tin and zinc.
g8 Apparent consumption  (measured  in metric  tons).TABLE 2.  Srutual  Chahe  1  World Producdon,  19651986
GDP  Ratio of Trade  Suure  of Prodton  (Share  in GDP)
World  Share a/  to Outpu b/  Agwltme  bid  Services
196S  1980  1987  1965  1986  196S  1986  196S  1986  1965  1986
- percentage
LowandMidlelncoueCounfrkshl  202  23.2  17.9  13.5  19.0  30  18  31  36  38  46
Lowincome  8.9  5.7  5.0  lOS  12.0  42  33  28  35  30  32
Middle  income  113  175  12.9  17.0  21.5  22  15  33  37  45  48
Highlyindebtedcounties  6.6  8.6  IS  13S  1S.0  20  is  34  37  46  48
Sub-SaharanAfrica  15  1.9  0.8  225  18.0  45  36  19  25  36  38
AsianNIEsc/  0.5  1.0  1.8  38.0  625  25  10  28  40  46  S0
1Igb  IncOBeOD  Countries  79.4  77.2  80.1  13.0  22.0  5  3  40  35  SS  62
Euope (Western)  29.3  - 329  21.0  31.5  - -_  -_  -.  _-  -
Gemsany,  Fe  Rjep.  65  7.9  7A  175  285  4  2  S3  40  43  58
Japan  5.2  10.3  15.6  93  10.5  9  3  43  41  48  36
United States  40.1  26.1  29.7  4.7  10S  3  2  38  31  59  67
s  IECAp  Dvson,  lntemation  Ecnom  Deparitent, based on  odld  Bank,  1989.
al  Fduding  Soviet  Union,  Eastn  Eop,  and the non-repor member  ntre
b/  For dvoigcouni:  ratio of the average  of cxrts  and ims  f goods  and no-ctor  seces  to GDP in cu  t doll  For industrial  countfie, t  ratio
is cakulated as te  average  of exports  and imports of goods and servies (naional ncome account  basis)  to GNP in  curent prices and loCa  currncy.
Ci Hong  Kong,  Korea,  Sinapoe  nd  Taia  ina Hong  Kong  and  Singpre  are  now  considered  High  ome  Countnes..TABLE  3.  Strucal  Changes  In  World  Tmde  in Manufactures.  19654195
EXPORIT OF MANUFACIURES
Shar  of Machinery
Destination  c:  and Trsport
lnel  a/  Word Share bl  Share  m Own  GDP  OB)  Countries  Equipmt  in ExpRtwd/
1965  1986  196S  1986  1965  1986  195  1986  1965  1986
- bLS  --  pereta
Low  ad  Mddeb noun  Coenlrks  7.9  2143  .5  16.0  23  9.1  47  S6  2  14
Lowincome  2.4  32.8  2.5  2A  1.6  53  56  45  1  4
Mldk  incme  5.1  180.6  5.7  13.2  2.7  10.4  45  60  3  16
Hlghlyindebted  counutes  13  32.1  1.4  23  12  4.5  60  48  12
Sub-Saharan  Africa  04  3.1  0.4  0.2  15  1.9  55  34  1  1
Asian  NEs e/  1.4  115.0  1.5  8.5  113  51.0  57  70  7  31
HIgh lncome OECD Conrires  863  1151.1  915  843  63  11.0  67  74  32  42
Europe(Western)  57.7  7213  612  52.8  11.5  19.1  73  79  35  40
Gern, Fed.Rep.  15.8  217.5  16.7  15.9  14.0  25.0  76  78  46  48
Japan  7.7  203.9  8.2  15.0  8.4  10.4  47  62  31  64
United  States  17.8  162.8  19.0  11.9  2.5  3.9  58  63  37  48
S  IECAP DWison,  Intnatimonal  Ecom  De  nt, based on Wold Bank,  1989.
a/  Crrt  US  dollar
bl Exclding Sovwiet  Union,  Easrn  pe,  Hig  ncome  Oil Exportes and the non-reportig member  cuntries.
Ci Pcent  of toa  manfactured eqxpr  dei  for ndusi  coune  mart
dl  Share  in total merandise  expors.
e/  Hong Kong,  Korea,  Singaoe  and Taiwan  (aina);  Hong Kong  and Sinpoe  are now consderd  HIg Inmme COMun10
Several  important trends have  affected  all nations  and have  increased  the degree of interdependence
during the past two  and a half decades. First, the ratio of trade to GDP has followed  an upward trend in nearly
all countries, with only brief interruptions during the recessions  of 1975  and 1982. Second, the international
financial  markets have expanded  very  rapidly,  outpacing  the rise in international  trade (Table 1). Between  1965
and 1987,  the ratio of world  exports to output rose by 6 percentage  points,  to 18 percent in 1987,  while the ratio
of international  banking activity  (as measured by net international  bank credit) to output soared from 1 percent
to 17 percent in the same period.  Another example  of the astonishing  growth of the financial  markets is the
rapid rise in the size of international  currency  trading,  which  is directly  related to the deregulation  of financial
markets,  and to some extent,  it appears to have been influenced  by the massive  current account imbalances  of
the major industrial  countries in the 1980s. In 1989,  for example,  the combined average daily volume  of trade
in the foreign exchange markets of Japan, the United Kingdom  and the United States reached $430 billion
(nearly  6 times larger than in 1979),  or about 50 times  larger than the average  daily  transactions  of internationally
traded goods and commodities.
Third, both  the direction  and composition  of international  financial  flows  have  undergone  a profound
change, especially  since the early 1980s. Because of its massive trade surplus,  Japan has become the largest
supplier  of international  capital since  the mid-1980s  - a position  which  was held by the United States in the 1960s
and 1970s. Moreover,  there has been a dramatic decline in the role of commercial  banks in channelling  the
capital flow as international investment in bonds and equities has surged during the 1980s. Net flows from
private creditors  to the developing  countries,  which  amounted to about $50 billion  in the early 1980s,  came to
a halt in the later part of the decade. In this context,  a key structural  shift has been the sharp rise in the ratio
of external debt to GNP for the developing  countries  as a group. This ratio for public  and publicly  guaranteed
debt rose from about 13.5  percent in 1970  to 27 percent in 1982  and 43 percent in 1987.
Fourth, in response to the changes in the structure of world demand and the emergence  of new
technologies  and its impact on production processes,  the role of raw materials in the global preduction and
consumption  has steadily  declineA And, because,  in part, of the protectionist  policies  of the industrial  countries
in the area of agricultural  trade, the share of raw materials in international trade has decreased while that of
manufactures  has increased  sharply ¢Table  1).  Indeed, the share of agricultural  products in total exports have
fallen more than the share of agricultural  value added in total output in most countries. By 1987,  the real price
of non-oil commodities  (nominal price index of 33 commodities  in dollars deflated by manufactures  unit value11
of exports of industrial  countries)  had fallen  by nearly  50 percent, compared  to its level  in 1965. Partly as a result
of terms of trade losses, the developing  countries that failed to respond to these changes (that is, failed to
diversify  their production  base and change the structure of their exports towards manufactures)  have tended to
suffer a steady deterioration in their living  standard during the last two decades.
Fifth, in parallel to the emergence  of the NIEs, there has been a continuing  shift towards services
in both production and trade within  the industrial  group, in the period 1965-86.  And, simultaneously,  the share
of agriculture  in total value added has steadily declined  in nearly all countries. By 1986,  in most of the high-
income  OECD countries  the value  added of the service  sector accounted  for sixty  percent or more of GDP while
the share of agricultural  sector had fallen to less than 4 percent (see Table 2). This  trend has also been reflected
in the structure of civilian  employment  in nearly  all industrial  countries. For example,  in the United States the
share of services in total civilian  employment  rose from 56 percent in 1960  to nearly 70 percent in 1986,  while
the same share for agricultural  employment  fell  from 9 percent to only  3 percent in the same period. Following
a similar  development  path, the Asian NIEs also experienced  a sharp fall in their share of agriculture  in output,
from 25 percent in 1965  to only 10 percent in 1986  - the lowest  among  the developing  regions  - while the share
of services to total value added rose from 46 percent to 50 percent in the same period.
Sixth, a key feature of global structural change during the past two decades has been the rapid
increase in  the  share of  machinery and  transport equipment and  science-based products (for  example,
pharmaceuticals  and electronics)  in total world  trade.  This aspect of world  trade has involved  a broad range of
products characterized by product differentiation  and economies of scale.  Again, this trend has been more
pronounced in the OECD area and in the Asian NlEs than in any other region.  Meanwhile,  within-industry
specialization  has led to a sharp rise in intra-industry  trade since  the mid-1960s,  particularly  in the high income
OECD countries. In these countries the share of intra-industry  trade in total trade increased  from 46 percent
in 1965  to 60 percent by mid-1980s,  while  nearly  three-quarters of the OECD area's science-based  products are
currently traded within the group.  These latter trends have not only facilitated the transfer of the new
technologies  among  the high income  countries  and thereby  speeded up the process  of convergence  of productivity
levels  tht  results from trade and closer economic  interaction  with technologically  more advanced  countries,  but
also allowed them to benefit from the increased lcvel of international  competition  in the intra-industry  trade
in manufactures.
Q'  See OECD, Sbuctunal  Adjustment and Economic  Peformance, 1987,  Paris, Tables 73 and 7A.1.12
Seventh,  there is some evidence  of an emerging  trend toward greater concentration  of trade flows
within three major trading blocks: North America, the European Community  and East Asia.  Since the early
W980s,  the volume  of trade within  each of these  regions has risen much faster than the total world  trade. Because
of recent trade agreements within these trading blocks,  it is expected that such developments  will continue to
gather strength in the futureY  To the extent that this development  leads to enhanced competition  and not to
trade diversion due to protective measures against countries outside the block, it should also help increase
productivity.
An important  conclusion  that may be drawn  from the above  trends is that structural  changes of the
past twenty years, particularly  in the international  trade area have, because of their role in bringing about a
greater degree of economic  efficiency,  flexibility  and dynamism,  been beneficial  to the high-income  group and
a select few  of the middle-income  countries. The trends relating  to greater economic  integration  and deepening
interdependence are likely to continue in the 1990s. Unless many low and middle income countries begin
quickly  to incorporate the necessary  changes  in their economic  structures by means of major policy  reforms in
order to allow a more rapid integration  into the international  economy, the process of widening  income gap
between  them and the higher-income  group, which  has emerged  in the 1980s,  will  probably  intensify  in  the decade
ahead.
2.2  The Global Projections  at a Glance
By definition,  the long-term growth  pottial  of an economy  is equal to the sum of its labor productivity  and
employment  growth  rates, each measured over  a period of several  years. In turn, the key determinant  of labor-
productivity  growth is technological  change.  Assuming  that technological  progress is embedded in the new
investment  goods,  an acceleration  in the rate of investment  will have  a positive  eftct  on labor-productivity  growth
over and above that  which  would  result from the increase in the capital-labor  ratio.
Over the last 110  years, between 60 to 70 percent of output growth in the high income OECD
countries can be explained  by labor-productivity  growth and the rest by employment  (man-hours) growth, due
largely to  increasing female participation and population growth offsetting the shortening of work week.
However, because ci  the  expected continuation of the  secular decline in working time per  worker and
d  World Bank (IECAP), "The Developing  Countries  and the Short-term Outlook for the World Economy,"
July 1989.13
demographic  changes,  which  may lead to a lower rate of growth  of labor force in most of the OECD countries
in the 1990s,  labor-productivity  growth must accelerate in these countries in order for them to improve,  and in
some cases even maintain, their real potential economic  growth during the next decade (see Table 4).
Indeed, in a number of industrial (that is, high-income  OECD) countries, mainly  as a result of a
recovery  in business  profits and favorable  real energy  prices since the mid-1980s,  investment  ratios have begun
to rise toward the levels  reached in the period immediately  preceding  the severe recession  of 1982-83.  The new
investments,  which  usualy embody  the latest technology,  have already  begun to have a positive  impact on labor
productivity,  particularly  in the manufacturing  sector, in nearly all major industrial countries (see Chart 1).
Although  the impac is still fairly  modest and mainly  pro-cyclical  in nature - 0.5 to 1 percentage  point increase
in the rate of growth of productivity  in most industrial  countries - it nevertheless  represents  an important change
from the 1970s. In addition,  there has been an acceleration  in R&D spending  in a number of industrial  countries
and the NlEs since  the early 1980s,  which  should result in a further increase  in the pace of technological  change
and its diffusion  over the next decade.
Thus, barring major adverse shocks and given a mix of macroeconomic policies conducive to
sustaining  the current momentum  of non-iflationary growth,  the industrial  countries  may  be expected  to continue
to  experience  some acceleration in their rates of growth of real per capita income in the 1990s (Table 4).
Although  there will be differences  among them, most of the major industrial  economies  are projected to grow
in the 1990s  at near or even somewhat  above  their long-term  trends, at any  rate significantly  above  their averages
in the early 1980s. In particular,  the ongoing  structural  transformations  and policy  reforms in Europe and Japan
will have a  positive influence on  the  growth rates  of their per  capita income during the  next decade.
Nevertheless,  there is potential for large adjustments  in real exchange  rates and for trade tension among the
major industrial  economies,  mainly  because  the growth  rates of productivity  in the leading exporting  and surplus
countries, notably Germany and Japan, are expected to consistently  exceed  those of the other major industrial
countries, particularly  the United States, in the 1990s.
Of course,  macroeconomic  policies  of the industrial  countries might not be so favorable. Inflation
might be allowed  to accelerate;  the existing  trade imbalances  among the major industrial  countries might,  if left
uncorrected, lead to more protectionism;  exchange  rates might fluctuate widely,  and real interest rates may
remain high or even  rise. Under combinations  of such circumstances,  international  trade and investment  would
be adversely affected and  economic growth would falter.  The low-case  scenario discussed in Section 5314
TABLE  4.  Lont-term Trends and ProJections  of Economic  Actllvity  1870-2000  O
Recent  Baueline
Longer-term  Trend  "Golden  Age"  Experience  Proections
1870s  to 1960s  1965.87  1960s  1980-88  1990s
Real GDP Growth
LAwand  Middle  Income  Countries  15at  53b/  63  42  5.0
o/w  Newly  Industdalizing  Economies  (Asia)  2.0 c/  85  9.1  75  6.9
Sub4Saharan  Africa  - 33  6.1  05  3.8
High  Income  OEMD  Countries  2.7  dt  3.3  5.2  2.7  3.0
Labor Producivity Growth
High  Income  OECD Countries  1.9  dt  2.1  4.2  1.6  23
otw  Westem Europe  1.7  2.6  4A  1.7  23
Japan  2.2  4.6  10.0  2.8  3.0
United States  2.2  1.0  2.0  0.9  15
Real GDP per Capita Growth
Low  and Middle  Income  Countries  0.1a  3.0  3.8  2.1  3.1
otw  Newly  Industrializing  Economies  (Asia)  0.2 cl  63  6A  5.7  S.5
Sub-Saharan  Africa  --  0.4  33  -2.6  0.7
High  Income  OECD Countres  1.5  dt  2.6  4.2  2.2  2.6
Population and Labor Force Growth
Low  and Middle  Income  Countries. Population  1.4a/  2.2  2.5  2.0  1.8
ohv  Newly  Industrializing  Economics  (Asia)  --  2.1  2.6  1.7  1.3
Sub-SaharanAfrica  --  2.9  2.6  3.2  3.1
Hibgh  Income  OECD Countries
Population  1.2  dt  0.9  1.0  0.6  0.4
Labor  Force  --  1.0  1.1  0.9  0.5
Sorc:  IECAP Division,  International  Economics  Department;  OECD, OECD Economic  Outlook vadous issues A. Maddison,
"Growth and Slowdown  in advanced Capitalist Economies: Techniques of Quantitative Assessment, JouMal of Economic
l  ,UM  June 1987,  pp. 649.698;  A. Maddison,  Phases of Capitalist  Development,  Oxford, 1982; and  ILO,  l  ial
Eoguation: 1950-20125,  Geneva,  1986.
a/  Rough  estimate for the period 1900-1960  based on vadous sources,  induding A. Maddison,  il  h
Cenll  OECD, 1989.
b/  Data from 1965  onward  is based on a sample of 90-countries,  which  excludes  High  Income  Oil Exporters  and the non-reporting
member  countries.
c/  Historial data for Exporters  of Manufactures  Asia are for theperiod 1900-1960and indudes onl  Korea  and Taiwan,  China.
The Group is defined to include Korea, Malaysia,  Taiwan (China), Thailand, and high income counties of Kong-Kong  and
singapore.
d/  Includes  France,  Federal  Republc of Germany,  Japan, Netherlands,  United Kingdom  and United States.
Al averages  are compound  annual  rates of change;  used throughout  this report unless  noted otherwise.15
Chart
Labor  PrducvIty  Growth  In Manufacturlng:  Major  Industral  Countries







1950-73  1973-79  1979-86  1986-88
Geriany  E5  Japan  u.s
Source:  Bureau  of  Labor  Sutaibos  U.S.  Depwotmeat  UfLbor
Chart 1. Data
Labor ftoducdvlty in Meanubdtuln - cbandge  per  year)
1950-73  197379  1979-86  19864
Japan  9.9  5.5  5.2  7.7
Germany  6.6  4.3  2.5  3.0
United  States  2.6  1.4  3.3  3.4
Output per hour in manufacturing  odcor.16
approximates  an environment  where policies  in industrial  countries  fail to take advantage  of the major positive
impulses  and opportunities  that are now present in the world  economy,  such as the economic  reforms in Europe
and Japan, liberalization  of world trade, anA  rapid pace of technological  change. The developing  (that is, low-
and middle- income) countries also stand to gain, or lose,  depending on which road they take: toward major
overhaul  of their domestic  economic  policies  that would  result in the macroeconomic,  structural, and institutional
changes required for a sustainable non-inflationary  growth in the 1990s,  or failure to adapt policies and thus
continue  to suffer low growth - even in the face of a favorable  global economic  environment.
Yet, in several important  respects the risks  and opportunities  faced  by the developing  countrics are
different from those faced by the industrial  countries. For most developing  countries new technologies  must
largely  be imported and their access to these technologies  depends on the availability  of foreign exchange  and
external financing  needed for the importation of the appropriate capital goods that embody these technologies.
The realizaton of the opportunities  depends crucially  on further liberalization  of international  trade and removal
of the exsting protectionist measures in both industrial and developing  countries.  Moreows, although the
compaiative advantage  of developing  countries seems to remain in producing and exporting relatively  labor-
intensive  products, they may have to move towards a relatively  more capital-intensive  strategy in the export
sector and also invest more heavily in human capital, to take advantage  of the economies of scale inherent in
international trade.  There is a need for further research in this area, but it should be noted that because of
the specificites of the current technological  progress and high investments  there has been an improvement  in
the competitive  position  of some of the traditional inuustries  (for example,  textile) in the industrial  countries  vis-
a-vis the developing  countries in recent years.
In addition,  the low- and middle-income  countries  face quite different  a demographic  situation  than
the high-income  countries. In the 1990s,  based on rough estimates, the average rate of growth of population
and labor force in the developing  countries is expected  to be nearly  four times that of the industrial  countries,
(2.0 percent per year vs. 0.5 percent per year).  This means that the developing  countries on an average must
grow  along a significantly  higher growth path than the industrial  countries  (the average margin of difference  in
population  growth rates is about 1.5 percentage  points),  just to maintain their relative position  in terms of real
per capita income with respect to the industrial  countries. To achieve  this higher growth path, the developing
countries  must raise the level of nct investment  and its efficiency  (by putting  more emphasis  on training  and skills
and management quality  both in the public  and private sectors), in ordcr to raise the rate of growth of labor17
productivity. This growth rate has been declining  in many cases in the 1980s.  In addition, in some of the
developing regions (notably Africa) where labor force growth is expected to accelerate in the  1990s, the
investment  ratios must be raised  just to prevent  the capital-labor  ratio from declining  further. Thus, demographic
factors will continue to complicate  the task of development  in the foreseeable future.  However,  it is important
to note that, on the basis of historical  experience,  if the per capita income levels  in the lew- and middle-income
countries begin to rise again  on a sustained  basis,  as the fertility  rates decline  significantly,  the population  growth
rates may  be expected  to decelerate  over  the following  two decades. The poorer countries would  gain more than
proportionately  from such a trend.
The baseline projections  for the low- and middle-  income countries as a group indicate an average
per capita growth of about 3 percent for the 1990s. Although  this expected  performance  is better than that in
the 1980s  and is in line with the trend growth  over the last two  decades,  it masks a serious divergence  in growth
rates among individual  countries. Moreover,  this projection  is fraught  with uncertainty. This uncertainty  stems
mainly  from three highly  interrelated areas: first,  the level  and cost  of financial  flows  to the developing  countries
and the level of domestic savings  that wiU  have to be mobilized  to finance the needed level of investment  to
achieve  2-3 percent per capita income growth in the l990s; secondly,  the degree of success of the individual
countries  in implementing  policy  reforms and making  the appropriate  structural and institutional  changes  in their
economies  to take advantage  of the opportunities,  and to hedge against the risks,  that lie ahead; and thirdly,  the
strength of world  trade and the degree of openness of industrial-country  markets to developing-country  exports.
That there will be major external shocks  can be taken for granted. Given the external debt problem currently
faced by many developing  countries, it is almost certain that they are not well prepared, either financially  or
politicaUly,  to cope  with, in the 1990s,  maior external shocks  analogous  to the ones that occurred  in the 1970s  and
early 1980s,  such as the sharp rise in energy prices and internationzal  interest rates.
Table 5 shows  some aggregate  indicators of investment  and its financing  since 1973  and the short-
term prospects for these indicators. As indicated in the table, for the industrial countries, as their ratio of
aggregate gross domestic  savings  to GDP has faUen  below  their investment to output ratio, real interest rates
have increased and remained high. The investment  ratio for the middle-income  countries has declined  sharply
from the high (and perhaps unsustainable)  level attained around l9BO  and could fall  below the level expected  to
prevail in the industrial countiies in the short run.  In most instances, the continuation of poor economic
performance  and lack of confidence  by both business  and household  sectors have inhibited  investments. There
are also important international factors behind this change: the shift in the external payments position of the18
TABLE  5.  Say-& hnvestmen  and T  nfer of  Resources
Shoit-tern
P  ojections
1973  1980  19S  197  188  1989
HEgh  Icome  OECD CountrIes  pecent 
Gross Domestlc  Savinp  25.9  22.2  20.6  193  19.7  20.5
(% of GDP)
Gross Domestic  Investmnt  2SA  23.0  20.6  20.1  205  210
(%  of GDP)
CAB a/ (% of GDP)  0.5  *0.8  0.0  .03  -03  .0.5
GDP Growth (% change,  4.0  2.2  3.6  35  3.  3.7
moving  average)*
Real Intetest Rate b/  1.7  OS  S5  3.9  45  45
Middle  Income Contres
Grmss  Domestic  Savlnge  235  25.9  24.8  25.2  19.5  d/  --
(% of GDP)
Gross Domestic  Investment  23.4  273  22.1  23.0  21.0  d/  --
(% of GDP)
GDP Gwth  (% change,  73  3.6  35  35  2.9
moving  aveage)"
NetTransferof  FiPndal  13  1.7  -1.8  -2.9  .2.6  _
Resources onaccount  of debt
(ratio to GNP) cd
CABe/ (%ofGNP)  40.2  4.7  -1.1  0.0  0.1  -N
IBCAP Division,  International  Economics  Department; OECD,  various issues;
and World Bank,  Wodable.  1987.
a/  Rtio  of net exports of goods and servies (national income acoount  basis), induding statistical discrepany, to
GDP.
b/  LJBOR  (six-month  dollar  deposits) adjusted  by  rate of change in US GDP deflator.
c/  Ratio of net disbusements minus interest  payments  to GNP.
d/  Preminary estimates,  based on World  Bank,  A  Table 2.4, p. 27.
e/  Balance  on cunrt  account  as  a percent of GNP.
'  Three year moving  average,  centered  on the year shown.19
industrial  countries,  from being a net exporter of capital to a net importer of capital,  and the rise in real interest
rates in the 1980s (Charts 2 and 2a).  The main cause of the swing in the exteinal payments position of the
industrial countries is the massive current account deficit of the United States, brought about by the sharp
expansion  of its budget deficit  during  the 1960s.  Since  the mid-1980s,  the United States nas been absorbing  about
$150  billion  of the world's savings  per year and thus bas been directly  competing  with the developing  col'itries
for capital to finance  its budget deficit  while fostering  a rise in its private  investment. A combination  of a large
fiscal  deficit  and a restrained monetary  policy  in the United States has kept real rates of interest relatively  high,
which  in turn has helped attract the needed foreign capital.
Since this process is likely  to continue well into the 1990s,  it is unlikely  that a substantially  higher
level of foreign capital or !rwer real rates of interest than in the 1980s  will be available to the developing
countries before the mid-le9Os 1 (see Sections  3.1 and 5.2 below for further discussion  of these issues).
Ihe decline ir  the level of external lending and the rise in interest rates have brought about a
substantial swing  in the net ttansfer of financial  resources  (on account of debt) to the middle-income  countries,
from an inflow  of more ehan  $21 billion  in 1980  (1.7 percent of their combined GNP), to an outflow of more
than $45  billion  in 1988  (2.0 p  ircent  of GNP). The large negative  transfer of resources is expected to continue
in the period 1989-90,  thw leading  to a further decline  in the middle-income  countries' investment  ratio, unless
the level of domestic  saving  is raised substantially. (These calculations,  however,  make no specific  allowance  for
the possible effects of the new initiatives toward debt relief which are discussed  in Section 5.4.)  For most
countries,  this implies that fiscal deficits  must be reduced substantially,  and higher private savings  encouraged
to finance investment  projec..
Rough eqtin:^es for inverse-ICOR,  or "investment  efficiency,"  indicate that over the last  decade
or so the efficiency  of investment  in the middle-income  countries as a group has fallen steadily  and the average
for the 1980s  has fallen below the OECD average (see Table Sa). A significant  rise in investment efficiency  in
the developing  countries m.ay  not be possible  without the replacement  of a sizable  portion of the existing  stock
of capital with a newer and more productive  vintage  and a more efficient  usage of both old and new machinery.
This task, however,  would  entail a substantial  increase in imports  of capital equipment and heavy  investment  in
human capital in order to upgrade the quality  of labor and management.
§'  A major reduction in military  spending,  as a dividend  of the recent rapprochement between the United
States and the USSR could result in a significant  decline in the level of the fiscal deficit  in the former. But its
effect on developing  countries,  aside from a possibie  decline  in real long-term interest rates, may  be ambiguous,
given the possibility  of higter demand for external financing  of domestic  investment  in Eastern Europe and the
USSR in the next 5 to 10 years.20
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TABLE  5a  Somne  Measures of Investment  Effidency.
Etatsof Economy-wide  Inverse-ICOR  a/. 1%5965
1965.73  1973.80  1980-8
ARl  Low and Mfiddle  Income  Countrie  0.28  0.20  0.16
Net rate of return bI  0.48  0.29  0.24
Middle  Income  CDuntries  0.28  0.20  0.12
Net rate of return b/  0.46  0.29  0.20
Low Income  Countries  0.28  0.18  0.20
Net rate of return bf  0.53  0.28  0.28
High  Income  OECD Countries  0.19  0.10  0.13
Not rate of return bt  0.29  0.17  0.21
Memo item:
Net rate of retikr
High performers  c/  0.27  0.19  0.23
LAw  performers  di  0.30  0.21  0.08
SouzK  JECAP  Divison, International  Economics  Department;  calculated  from OEMD,
a/  Inverse  of incremental  capital-output  ratio.
b/  Invers-ICOR corrected for depreciation  of capital,  which  is  assumed  to be 10  percent.
el  43  deveoping ountries that performed wellin thel1980s  (see Table 6and Chart8).
d/  Adeveloping  countries  that did Mg  perform  wel in the 1980s  (see Table 6 and
TABLE  Sb:  Determniants  of Long-term  Growth of Per Capita Income a/
AHl  Developing  Countries  bi  LOW  Performers  C/
Explaatory  Vastabla  1970488  1980-88  1970-88  198D-88
Powultlon Growth  .0.490  .0594  -0.042  -0.182
(.3.0)  (.2.9)  (.0.2) 0  (408)
Investment Effort d/  0.105  0.112  0.075  0.079
(5.2)  (4.3)  (25S)  (lA) 
Export Gowth c  0.309  0.241  0.29  0.192
(10.8)  (7.9)  (.)(4.7)
ExenlDebt  Burden fl  .0.020  40004  .0.021  0.006
(3.4A)  (.0.8)  *(.2.7)  (.0.8)
Equation R 2(Adjusted)
0.76  0.60  0.65  0.39
Qaz  IECAP  Divison, International  Economics  Department.
u/  Cross.section  regresson, using  average  growth  rates in the periods specified  as observations. Figures  in
parenthesis  are t4statistic,  and all  are significant  except  those  with an asterisk.
b/  A sample  of 87 low  and middle  income  developing  countries.
c/ 48  countries  that did niot  perform  well  in the 198ls (see Table 6).
di  Average  ratio of real gros domestic  investment  to GDP.
*t  Aveage rate of growth  of volume  of exports.
f/ Averag  ratio  of  stock  of external  debt  to  GDP.22
Investment efficiency  within the developing  country group is far from uniform.  As indicated in
Table 4, there is a wide divergence  in economic  performance  between  the major exporters of manufactures  and
the rest of the developing  regions.  While the average income growth and the associated level of investment
efficiency  (measured by inverse-ICOR) for the Asian NEEs  remained more or less stable in the  1980s as
compared with  the 1970s,  those for Latin  America fell  by two-thirds  in the same period. Moreover,  in the 1980s
the ratio of investment  to GDP has remained stable at about 30 percent in the Asian NIEs, while it has fallen
sharply  to between  15 percent and 17 percent in the heavily  indebted countries  and non-oil  commodity  exporters.
The net transfer of financial  resources  away  from the last two  country  groups to the creditor countries,  continued
capital flight,  and the failure of domestic  savings  levels  to rise sufficiently  senem  to be the most significant  factors
in explaiuing  the collapse  of the investment  ratiosY  hi a large number of countries, the sharp decline in the
investment  ratios (in both public  and private  sectors) have  hurt their export capacity. Although  world  trade was
strong in the period 198688,  for many countries their external  trade linkages  and the inteinal dynamics  of their
trade sector proved  to be insufficient  to generate a faster pace of economic  growth. For many of these countries
the financial  linkages have tended to have counter-cyclical  effects (for example, simultaneously  facing higher
output growth and higher real interest rates in the OECD area) and thus have had a dampening  effect on these
countries' growth performance. Only a few  developing  countries have been able to take full advantage of the
recent resurgence of world trade.
Moreover,  the preliminary  statistical  results shown  in Table 5b indicate that both investment  effort
and export drive have  had a significant  positive  impact on the per capita income  growth of developing  countries,
while high population  growth  has become an increasingly  important factor  in impeding  the growth of per capita
income ir. the 1980s. The regression estimates also indicate  that countries  with a higher level of external debt
burden on average  have a lower long-term  growth  of per capita income, even  after taking account of the effects
of other v3riables  such as investment  effort and export  growth. In this context,  the debt burden variable  not only
tends to  -apture the effect of the implied  financial  outflows,  which  tend to dampen growth, but also serves as
an indicator of the extent of domestic  policy  failure in raising  domestic  savings  and lowering  fiscal  deficits.
Charts 3-5  delineate the historical  trends in real per capita income  of different regions and country
groupings  relative to that of the US, using  1980  prices and exchange  rates. These Charts exhibit  the two entirely
V  See Robert Lynn  and F. Desmond  M-Carthy, "Recent Economic  Performance of Developing  Countries,"
World Bank, PPR Working  Paper No. 228,  July 1989.23
different  growth  paths  within  the  developing  country  group  since  the later part of the 1970s.J  The continuation
of these  trends  into  the 1990s,  which  would  imply  further  relative  decline  in the standard  of living  of Africa  and
Latin  America,  is particularly  alarming.
Chart  3: Relative GDP Per Capita: High Income and Developing .ountries  (1965-87)
(oonsbtnt  1880  prices;  1965  U.S.  GDP  per  person  - 100)
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23  Two  Development  Tracks?
Economic  performance  has  always  varied  greatly  across  countries.  Indeed  wide  differences  in the  rate of growth
of productivity  and, therefore,  in economic  growth  is one of the "stylized  facts" that a growth  model  should
explain.Yf  However,  as already  disAssed,  what  has  become  a disturbing  and puzzling  feature  of the developing
countries'  economic  performance  in the 1980s  is the emergence  of two  groups  which  not only  have  radically
different  performance  records  but also  differ  in their  capacities  to respond  to changes  in international  economic
V  For counterparts  to Charts  3 and 4, which  use  the intercountry  comparisons  presented  in the Penn  World
Table (Mark4),  see Annex  C, Charts  Cl and C2. The PWT  presents  real GDP per capita  figures  adjusted  for
purchasing-power  parity,  and these  figures,  in general,  differ  from  real GDP per capita  data based on offical
exchange  rate conversions.  While  the relative  poskions  and the extent  of difference  are somewhat  different  in
the charts  based  on the PWT,  the long-term  trends  are similar  in both sets of charts.
i  For an example  of a list  of "stylized  facts"  see N.  Kaldor,  "Capital  Accumulation  and  Economic  Growth,"
in F. Lutz  and D. Hague (ed.),  The Theory  of Capital  St. Martin,  1961.24
Chart  4: Relative  GDP  Per  Capita:  Developing  Countries  (1965-87)
(oonstn 1980  pries; 1965  US  GDP  per person  100)
Index  (1965  US  GDP  per  capita=iOO)
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Chart  5: Relative  GDP  Per  Capita:  Focus  on Sub-Saharan  Africa,  China  and India
(oonstan 1980  prioes;  1965  US  GDP  per  peron  =  100)




1  1965 1967  1969 1971  1973 1975  1977 1979  1981  i983  1985  1987
Source: EEC.25
environment.W  On the surface,  these  two  country  groups  seem  to have  had a fairly  similar  growth  performance
in the 1960s  and 1970s.  In fact,  the causes  of the divergence  are quite  deep-seated.  As early  as the 1970s,  the
performance  of the two  groups  in terms  of per capita  income  growth  began  to differ. The growing  divergence,
however,  was  "covered  up" by the high  borrowing  strategy  of the "low  performers"  which  was  not sustainable,
and led  to the crisis  at the end of the 1970s  and early  1980s.
From the data presented  in Table 6 (and Charts  6 and 7), it is cle.ar  that while  the growth  (and
investment  performance)  of the two  groups  were  more  or less  similar  prior  to the 1980s,  the "low-performing"
group  was  adversely  affected  in the  198OsL)  The  main  characteristics  of this  group  are  (see  Annex  A for a more
detailed  statistical  evidence): relatively  low ratio of export  to GDP; low rates of invcstment  itg  the 19830s;
relatively  high  dependence  on exte nal  borrowing  in the 1I70s  and  the earl 1980s;  rclaiiwly  small  m.-nufacturing
base;  high rates of inflation;  and fairly  small population  sdi&  but high rate of populatCon  grow*.. rut  most of
these characteristics  are closely  related to the domlestic  policies  followed  by these countries in the 1960s and
1970s,  such as import substitution  and heavy  reliance  on external  borrowing  to finance  investment  projects,  which
in many instances proved to be costly and inefficient. Given their structural weaknesses  these low  performers
were hit hard by the adverse international economic conditions in the first half of the 1980s and, more
importantly,  they were unable to respond to the opportunities  offered by the relatively  rapid growth in world
trade and in economic  activity  of the OECD countries in the second  half of the decade.
On the other hand, for the "high-performers"  group - which includes  all of the Asian NIEs (see
Chart 8) and close to half the population of the low- and middle- income countries - the investment  to output
ratios have continued to rise, providing  these countries a higher supply capacity  to respond to foreign demand
quickly  without  facing  inflationary  pressures. For most of these countries  the contribution  of investment  to GDP
growth has risen substantially  in the recent years. In the period 1986-88,  nearly  one-half of the GDP growth in
the Asian NIEs was attnbutable to the rise in investment  demand,  compared with almost no contribution  from
investment  to GDP growth in Lafin America and Sub-Saharan  Africa as groups.
As argued below,  investment  performance  and the degree of outward-orientation  of economy can
go a long  way  in explaining  the apparent "de-coupling"  between  the economies  of the low  performers and those
of the high income countries in the 1980s  and, possibly  even in the  l990s.  Indeed, even in the face of a faster
v  Shahrokh Fardoust and Ashok Dhareshwar, "An Empirical Enquiry into Some Aspects of the Two
Development  Tracks Hypothesis,"  IECAP, World Bank,  August 1989  (processed).
1Q  For a counterpart to Chart 6, which  uses the intercountry  comparisons  presented in Penn World Tables
(Mark 4), see Annex C, Chart C3. Also, see footnote 7 above.26
TABLE  6.  WldenIng  Dlsparities  of Growth 
(annual average  nercentage  chane)
Short-Term  Projections
1965-73  1973-80  1980D88  198748  1989-90
GDP Grewt
AU  Low  ad Middle  Income a/  6.0  5.1  4.0  S.1  3.9
Hgh Performers bJ  6.2  SA  7.6  9A  59
Low Performers e/  58  4.8  13  1.8  2.0
GDP  Growth  Per Capita
AU  Low  and  iddle Income  3A  3.0  2.0  3.1  1.9
Higb Performens  3.7  3.5  6.0  7.7  4.0
Low Perfolmer  3.2  2.3  -.3  40.8  4.6
Investment  to GDOP  Ratba
All Low  and MIddle icome  21.1  25.9  24.9  233  2A.9
High Performers  22.2  27.6  32.0  34.  32.8
LOw  Performers  19.1  22.9  16.6  145  14.9
So=:  IECAP Dividon,  International  Economics  Department;  See  Annex  A.
a/  A sample  of 87 low  and middle  Income  countries.
b/  13  countiets that performed  well in the 1980s they  had favorable  grwth performance  (per capita  income  grmwth  of 2 per cent or
more peryear) MA had above-average  iwestment ratios in  1980-88.  In 1987,  these countries  had a combined  population  of 2064
million  and an aggregate  real GDP of more than S1129  billion (in 1980  dollars).
c/  48 countries  that did not perform  well in tht 1980s they had unfavorable  gowth (per capita incomc  growth  of less than 2 percent
per year) ad had below  average investment  ratios  in 1980D88.  In 1987,  these countries  had a combined  population  of 1005  million  and
an aggregate  real GDP of S1087  billion  (in 1980  dollars).
*  All average  growth ratet are compound  annual  rates of change  calculated  using  the beginning  and ending  years of the indicated
interval.27
Chart 6
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Note:  "High" Performers: sample of 13 developing  countries; "ow"  Performers: sample of 48 developing
countries. See footnote to Table 6.
Source: IEC.
Chart 7
Projected  Aggregate  GOP  Levels of Hlgh- and Low-Peflormers
Among the Developing  Cournfles
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Chart 8
Growth and Investment Performance  of Low- and Middle-income  Countrles, 1980-1988
Growth  of GDP  per  capita,  A Inp,
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Source:  IEC.29
pace of economic  activity  in the industrial  countries,  the low performers  may not necessarily  improve  their
economic  performance.  A cumulative  history  of low  and inefficient  investment,  which  may  be a good  proxy  for
poor domestic  policies,  a low level  of productive  capacity  and a lack of the necessary  manufacturing  base,
particlarly in the export  sector,  may  not allow  a significant  rise in exports  of these  countries  without  t.  ating
inflationary  pressures  or a significant  drop  in the level  of private  consumption.
Moreover,  statistical  estimates  suggest  that the root of some of the major  problems  that the low
performers  are facing  today  may  date back to their investment  efforts and the domestic  policies  that they
followed  in the 1960s  and 1970s.  Estimates  in Table  5a show  that while  efficiency  of investment  for the high
performers  sem to have  risen  in the l980s,  that for the low  performers  has continued  its steady  decline  since
the 1970s. Furthermore,  as indicated  in Table  5b,  the  effect  of  a one percentage  point  inrcease  in the  investment
to output  ratio  on growth  of GDP  per capita  is estimated  to be nearly  30  percent  smaller  for the low  performers
than  for the developing  countries  as a group.
Another  aspect  of these diverging  growth  paths is the apparent  clustering  of the low  performers
around  a subtantally lower  average  growth  rate than  that  of the  developing  countries  as a group.  For the  period
of 1980-88,  the average  annual  (unweighted)  rate of growth  of real GDP  for tho low  performers  was  about  1.4
percent  (with  a sharply  declining  standard  deviation  of growth  rates),  compared  with  6.0 percent  for the high
performers.  This  may  indicate  that the overal distribution  of growth  rates  of developing  countries  has tended
toward  a bi-modal  distribution,  with  a large  number  of countries  clustering  around  a very  low  mean (Charts  9
and 10).
A positive  effect of rapid and sustained  growth  on alleviation  of poverty  can be established.
Therefore,  projecting  "two  development  tracks"  into  the 1990s  and beyond  has important  implications  for the
extent  and distribution  of poverty  in the  developing  regions.  Given  that most  of the  so called  "high  performers"
are Asian  countries,  including  China  and India,  any  projection  of growth  trends  that does not assume  radical
changes in domestic  policies  in the "low performers" would  suggest  that the global "center of poverty" would
gradually  shift  away  from  Asia  into  the other  developing  regions,  particularly  Africa,  during  the  coming  decades.
As indicated  in Chart  8, different  groups  of developing  countries  face  quite different  problems  as
regards  the growth  and investment  issue. Obviously,  there are a large  number  of countries  with a low  growth
of per capita income which have also been experiencing  low investment ratios in the 1980s  (that is, the "low
performers").  For many  of these  countries  the ratio of net  investment  to output  may  in fact  be close  to zero,
or even  negative  in some  cases. For this  group  of countries,  which  contains  many  African  and Latin  Amaerican30
countries,  the level  of investment  appears  to be the main  bottleneck.  However,  there is another  relatively  large
group  made  up of countries  with  high  investment  to output  ratio  but low  per capita  income  growth. The  main
problem  of these  countries  may  not be the level  of investment  but its efficiency  and sectoral  distribution.
The  picture  could  change  significantly  in the 1990s.  Many  of the  low  and middle  income  developing
countries  are currently  undergoing  major policy  reforms  and structural  adjustments  which  could  result  in a
marked ncrease  in the efficiency  of their investments  and a higher  income  growth.31
Chart 9
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3.  ISSUES: OPPORTUNITES AND  RISKS FACING  THE GLOBAL  ECONOMY
IN THE NEXT DECADE
There are several  distinct  but interrelated underlying  currents in the international  economy,  which  will to a large
extent influence the growth prospects in both the. developing  and industrial  economies in the 1990s. Some of
these factors are of a shorter-termi  nature, and thus should mainly affect the initial conditions  of the world
economy in the 1990s,  while others are of a longer-term nature and will be influencing  the growth-path  of the
world economy  over the entire decade and beyond. Seven  major "currents" are covered  here: adjustment and
balance of payments disequilibria  among the major industrial countries; deregulation of markets; financial
conditions  in the 190s;  emerging  changes in international  trade, and the trade effects of the ongoing  changes
and economic reforms in the socialist economies;  rapid pace of technological  change; demographic factors;
environmental  issues; and availability  of material resources.  Each of these currents implies both risks and
opportunities  for the developing  countries in the 1990s. Aside from highlighting  the major expected  economic
developments  in the 1990s,  an attempt is made to interrelate  them and draw policy  conclusion  for the developing
countries.
3.1  Adjustment and Dlsequillbria  In Induswral Countries
An important part of the opg'oing  economic  adjusLnent  in the industrial  countries,  which  is expected to drag into
the 1990s,  is in response  to the massive  buildup  of balance  of payments  disequilibria  among the major industrial
countries and their attempts at market deregulation in the 1980s. In 1988,  the current account deficit of the
United States amounted to $130  biDlion  - which  was  nearwly  equal to the combined  surplus  of Germany  and Japan
- and was financed  with massive  inflow  of private  capital ($100  billion) into the United States. Although  these
imbalances  have declined somewhat  from their peak, both in level and as a percent of GDP, the correction
process has been slow  and the absolute levels  still remain quite large by historical  standards (Table 7).
Between 1981 and 1987, the  U.S. current balance swung from a  surplus of $7 billion to  an
unprecedented deficit of about $155 billion,  a deterioration of $162 billion. Most researchers have identified
the macroeconomic  policy  mix  of the United States during  this  period as the fundamental  cause of the emergence
of such a massive  external imbalance. A combination  of relatively  tight monetary  policy  and very expansionary
fiscal policy  during most of the decade of the 1980s  resulted in high real interest rates, a sharply appreciating
currency (mainly  in the period 1981-85)  and a very  precipitous  rise in the level of imports. The strong dollar,
the collapse  of imports of the heavily  indebted developing  counties from the United States, and relatively  slow33
growth in domestic  demand in the other industrial  countries were the key factors that inhibited the growth of
the U.S. exports during the same period.  Consequently,  between 1981 to 1986,  the U.S. merchandise  export
volume  rose by less than 2 percent wbile its imports  inzreased  by more than 40 percent. The expansionary  fiscal
policy  resulted in a sharp widening  of the U.S. federal budget deficit during the first half of the 1980s. This
deficit, as a percentage  of GNP, rose from 2.4 percent in 1981  to 53 percent in 1985,  before gradually  declining
to 3.4 percent in 1988.
However,  besides the sharp rise in government  deficit,  there has  been another key factor  behind the
massive  current account deficit  of the United States: a substantial  change in the US. private  saving-investment
balance, as the U.S. private savings  rate has gradually  declined in the recent years.  The private sector's net
savings ratio has steadily declined from about 10.5 percent in the mid-1970s  to  only 6.4 percent in  1987.
Although the same ratios have also come down in some of the other major industrial  countries,  they generally
remain substantially  higher than that of the United States. For example,  in Japan the net private saving  ratio
has decined from about 20.1 percent in the 1970s  to 14.4  percent in 1987,  while in Germany the same ratio has
actually  increased marginally  from about 11.0  percent to 11.6  percent in the same period.
However,  despite the decline  in the saving  rate, the private  investment  rate in the United States has
remained more or less stable.  Gross domestic  private investment  to GNP ratio, which averaged around 17.0
percent in the 1970s  has declined only  marginally,  averaging  about 165 percent in the 1980s  (with the ratio of
net private investment  to GNP declining  from 8 percent to 6 percent between  the 1970s  and mid-1980s  before
rising to about 9 percent in 1988). Therefore,  the gap between  prvate saving  and investment  in the United States
ipgan to increase at about the same time that the U.S. government  began to increase its dissaving.  As a result,
the total domestic  saving  and investment  balance has deteriorated sharply  since the mid-1980s,  amounting  to a
deficit (excess  of investment  over saving) of about $150  billion  in 1987  and somewhat  less in 1988.
The counterpart  of this  growing  internal  imbalance  has been the sharp rise in the level  of net foreign
investment in the United States,  which  amounted to $160  billion  in 1987  and around $136  billion  in 1988. Since
foreign funds are fongible, it is not clear if the massive  inflow  of capital into the United States has primarily
financed  the budget deficit  or domestic  private  investment. What is clear, however,  is that these capital inflows
have allowed  the United States to maintain  a very  large fiscal  deficit without  sacrific!ng  private  investment.
One of the critical  macroeconomic  questions  concerning  the outlook  in the l990s  is the sustainability
of the massive  internal and external imbalances  of the United States and their financing. The liberalization  of
|  qe  |  a  ~~~~  ~~  ~~l  *.  F34
capital movements  in the industrial  countries and the system  of floating  exchange  rates have thus iar allowed  a
smooth financing  of the U.S. current account deficit.  With the exwption of 1987,  when massive amounts of
foreign  official  reserve (about $100  billion) - in the form of intervention  in currency  markets in support of the
dollar - were used, the U.S. current account has been financed  with foreign private capital. As a result, the
estimated net international  investment  position  of the United States has turned around from a creditor position
of $106  billion in 1980  to a debtor position  of about $500  billion in 1988. This negative  net debt position could
amount to $1 trillion by early 1990s.
Given  the size and dynamism  of its economy  and the key role of the dollar in the world economy,
the United States can continue to have a relatively  large current account deficit for a while longer, without
encountering "creditworthiness" problems.  By the end of 1988,  the net external debt of the United States
amounted to ab,out  11  percent of its nominal  CNP. By  comparison,  the net debt of the highly  indebted countries,
such as Argentina and Brazil, amounted to about 25 percent of their GNP.W However,  the high dependence
of the United States on foreign funds to fnance its domestic  investment  could pose some potential risks to the
world  economy  in the 1990s. Since nearly  two-thirds  of the net domestic  investment  in the United States in the
period 1985-88  was financed by imported capital, the prospec-as  for its long-term growth have become highly
dependent on foreign investors' decision  to accumulate and hold increasing proportion of their portfolios in
dollar-denominated  assets. Recent analysis  shows  that although the share of the U.S. assets as a percentage of
financial  assets  of the private  sector in the industrial  countries  has risen signiacantly  since  1982,  the absolute  level
of the share is still modest,  at about 3 percent) 3'
In Germany and Japan, the two largest surplus countries and suppliers of capital to the United
States, gross domestic saving  has remained well in excess  of gross domestic investment  throughout the 1980s.
Therefore, given their excess savings  and the deregulation of their capital markets in the last few years, the
private  investors  in Germany  and Japan could  continue  to finance  the current account  deficit  of the United States
without  much difficulty  for the next few years.
li  The "net external debt" of the U.S. referred to here is in fact the negative  of the U.S. net international
invesrment  position. The "net'  external debt in the developing  countries is their gross debt minus  international
assets  held abroad (see DJH.  Howard, "The United  States as a Heavily  Indebted  Country," International  Fnance
Discussion  Papers, No. 353, May 1989).
123  Michael Dealtry and Jozef Van't dack, "The U.S. External Deficit and Associated Shifts  in International
Portfolios," BIS Economic  Papers, No. 25, September 1989.35
However, as the U.S. external debt builds up and the fiscal  policy  debate (that is, Congressional
debates about Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  deficit targets) continues without a  resolution, the  financial risks
worldwide  become larger. Taere are several  possible  adjustment  paths: (a) the "soft landing" scenario: some
cyclical  slowdown  in the U.S. economic  activity,  gradual depreciation  of the dollar,  gradual but steady reduction
in the budget deficit through some spending  cuts, collaboration  of the G-7 central banks to ensure the stability
of global  financial  markets,  growth  remaining  stable  in Europe and Japan, and continuation  of smooth financing
of the U.S. current account deficit,  which wiUl  decline slowly  by the end of the 1990s;  (b) the "hard landing'
scenario: the U.S.  policy  debate reaches  a deadlock  on the fiscal  deficit,  foreign  investors  decide they do not wish
to further accumulate  dollar-denominated  assets,  the dolslr depreciates  sharply  against  other key currencies,  the
U.S. interest rates rise precipitously,  the U.S. economy goes into a recession, and the external deficit gets
corrected via a sharp decline  in the U.S. imports; and (c) "adjustment with growth scenario" (baseline): the
United States takes appropriaite  and decisive  policy  action  to ret  .ce  the budget deficit  by moderately  increasing
taxes and cutting military expenditures,  economic  activity  slows  down initially,  real interest rates decline and
remain relativelv  low, growth in domestic demand strengthens in Europe and Japan, and foreign investors
continue to finance the current account deficit of the United States which  will decline significantly  while the
dollar remains fairly stable.
Given the course and nature of the policy  debate in the United States during  1989,  and the financial
volatility  of October 1987  and October 1989,  all three of the scenarios  above appear to be roughly  equally  likely.
Obviously,  this could change in the next couple of years. Meanwhile,  private investors  worldwide  fear scenario
(b) but hope for scenario (a) or (c).  (The impact of these scenarios on the rest of the world are discussed  in
Section 5.)
In sum, it is very likely  that the economic  events in the next few  years, including  those induced by
policy  change, will be shaped by the impact of the current account imbalances  of the three largest industrial
economies  on international  interest rates, on key exchange  rates, on prices of assets and commodities,  and on
trade and financial  flows. Both the speed with which  these disequilibria  unwind and the manner in which  the
massive  current account deficit of the United States :- financed,  will influence  the medium-term prospects  for
economic  growth and inflation  in the industrial  countries. These factors,  in turn, will  affect trade volume,  terms
of trade, and cost of borrowing  fo  the developing  countries. In addition,  the geographical  allocation of the
massive  payments  surpluses  of Geruany and J&pan  will,  to a large extent,  determine the level  of financial  flows,36
including  direct investment, to the developing  countries.  Table 7 shows  some of the existing external and
internal imbalances  in the world economy.
As shown  in Table 8, the prospective  patterns of domestic  and foreign trade demand in 1985-90  are
radicaly different from those prevailing  in the first half of the 1980s. Domestic demand is expected to weaken
in the United States,  while it should continue  to remain strong in Japan and Western Europe. This new pattern
of demand,  together  with  the lagged  effects  of exchange  rate developments  in the period 1985  to mid-1988,  should
exert a strong influence  on the direction  of global trade flows  - towards  Western Europe and Japan.  Although
the overall level of imports into the developing  countries is also expected  to grow  moderately,  the recovery  for
the middle-income  group is projected to be rather weak, mainly  because  of the heavily  indebted countries. This
is also reflected in the projected low rate of growth of domesic demand in the heavily indebted countries.
Therefore, only  Japan and Western Europe are expected to support growth in world demand in the medium
term.
3.2  Deregulation  of Markets
Since the early 1980s,  the world  economy  has witnessed  widespread  deregulation  of product, labor and financial
markets. Also, privatization  of publicly  owned enterprises has taken place in many industrial and a number of
developing countries  during  the  same  period./  A  number  of  industries, ranging from  airlines to
telecommunications,  have been deregulated in some of the industrial  countries,  and the process is spreading  to
other countries. The transition  has not been smooth in all cases, and in some instances the larger firms seem
to have benefited disproportionately  from deregulation.
In general, the major aim of privatization  schemes has been to promote economic efficiency  and
increase the level of competition  and remove the existing  price distortions. These reforms, which have taken
place in nearly  all major industrial  countries and some of the smaller countries since the 1980s,  seem to have
been quite successful in achieving  their aim, particularly  in  airlines and telecommunications,  where labor
productivity  has risen substantially. 3 P
/  For a study of structura!  changes in industrial  countries  see: OECD, StucwaAdjussnent  and Economic
Perfomance, Paris, 1987. Fo. an analysis  of majox  policy  reforms in the centrally  planned  economies,  see United
Nations, World  Economic Suwe  1989,  New York, 1989,  Chapter 6, pp. 113-130.
4  Elizabeth E. Bailey, "Price and Productivity  Change Following  Deregulation: The US. Experience,"
Economic  foumal, 1986,  pp. 1-18.37
TABLE  7.  Mador  Extenal  and Intal  Imabalaces  In the World Economy
Histowy  Forecast  a/
197S-80  1982  1988  1989
Cuneut Account  Dalauce  . - ~bli.of  doluns(or percentage)-
Eurxpe  (major  4): lewl  0.1  .10.8  13A  10.7
(peceent  of GNP)  (0.0)  (.0.2)  (0.3)  (0.2)
Q1w  Germany,  Fed.  Rep:  level  03  5.1  48.5  55
(percent  of GNP)  (0.0)  (0.8)  (4.0)  (4.7)
Japan:  level  1i8  6.9  795  61
(percent  of GNP)  (0.0)  (0.6)  (2.8)  (2.2)
United  States:  level  -1.1  87  -126.5  4116
(perent of GNP)  (-0.0)  (40.3)  (2.6)  (-1.9)
Asian  N13s  b/: level  2.7  -2.7  28  26
(percent  of GNP)  (-2.8)  (-2.0)  (8.0)  (7.0)
17  Highly  indebted  countries
levl  -21A  -S3.1  -0.1 b/
(pement  of GNP)  (.3.0)  (40)  (-13)  ...
Gewral  Gov_ument  Fsca  alance  R.  peentg  efGNP 
7 Major  High  Income  OECD  Countries  -2.9  *4.0  .1.7  .1.1
oaw  United  States  -13  -3.5  .2.1  .1.6
17  Hig  indebted  counties  d/  -3.6  .60  -S.0  b/  -
Sg;  IEAP Dision, Interational  Economics  Department;  WIP,  Oud  Ocoba 1989,
OECD,  - -.  -.  December  1989.
aI  Forecast,  OECD.
b/ Hong  Kong,  Korea,  Singpo  and Taiwan  (China).
C/ Preliminary  estmate.  as of mid 1989.
d/  Central  government  fiscal  balance.38
TABLE  a  Changing  Pattem of Domestc and Foreip  Demand In High,  Middle,
and Low  Income  Countries,  1960-1990
(average annual percent  change)
Longer-Tetm  Short-Term
Trend  Projections  b/
1960.80  9828S  1986-88a/  1989-90
Real Domestic  Demand e
United States  33  4.0  3.2  23
Europe d/  3.8  1.7  3.9  3.2
Japan  7.3  2.9  S.7  S.1
Middle  Income  Countries  63  -0.1  2.9  33
Low Income  Countries  (includ.  China)  S.2  9.2  S.6  6.9
Highbly  Indebted Developing  6.2  -1.4  2.0  25
Growth of Imports Minus
Growth of Exports  e
United States  -0.6  7.9  -2.7  -3.6
Eutope d/  0.2  .03  3.1  0.2
Japan  -2.4  .3.8  8.7  2.5
Middle  Income  Countries  2.0  -93  -1.0  2.0
LOw IncoMe  Countries  (includ.  China)  1.7  5A  -105  0.5
Highly  Indebted Developing  2.6  -1S3  .1.0  15
Memo Iteran
Gowwth  of volome  of merchandise  imports
United States  5.0  15.0  S.7  5.2
Europe d/  55  4.7  7.5  8.2
Japan  4.1  3.0  13.0  75
O:  IECAP  Division,  International  Economics  Department;  OECD,  Dember
1989.
a/  For the developing  countries,  1988  rigures  are preliminary  estiynates.
b/  Forecast for developing  countries  are based on March (1989)  revisions  of the LIifiiw
c/  Total rea domestic  d.mand.
d/ Largest  four Western European economies:  France,  Germany,  Italy  and the United Kngdom.
e/  G.owth rate of real imports of goods  and services  minus  grwth rate of real expots of goods and services,
both  in  national  ncme  acount  basis39
An interesting and potentialiy  important phenomenon  that has been associated  with some of the
recent market deregulation  schemes  is the resulting  organizational  change. Organizational  innovations,  such as
the "hub-and-spoke" system  in the airline industry,  were unanticipated at the time of implementation  of the
deregulations,  but later proved  to be the key factor responsible  for the observed  efficiency  gains.
By the beginning  of the 1980s  many  governments  in the industrial  countries  began to recognize  that
the large subsidies  that were granted to various  industries  during the 1960s  and 1970s  to facilitate  restructuring
had instead  resulted in increased  inefficiency  and compromised  competitiveness.  In addition,  these  su)sidies had
contnbuted to the substantial  deterioration  of public  sector fiscal  balances  in these countries. It is estimated that
subsidies  to all sectors  of econiomies,  even  if conservatively  measured,  average about 2.0 to 2.5 percent of GDP
in the OECD countries. The average ratio for the European economies  is even higher.
During the 1980s  important  steps have  been taken in a number c.f  industrial  countries to scale back
the existing  industrial  subsidies. However,  with the exception  of a few  countries, the progress in this area has
generally  been slow  and the process  has been complicated  by social  and political  considerations.  Some  key issues,
including  the less  visible financial  transfers to selected industries,  will have to be addressed in the 199Gs  in the
context of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations  and Project 1992  in Europe.
The industrial  countries  have also begun to address the issue of agricultural  subsidies,  which  will  be
one of the critical issues in the 1990s  with important implications  for the developing  countries. Such subsidies
have led to serious price distortions  and over-production  in the industrial  countries. These in turn have reduced
the incentives  for agricultural  production  in countries with  a comparative  advantage  in that sector, such as many
developing  countries. The immediate  impact  of the removal  of agricultural  subsidies  by industrial  countries couldr
be a significant increase in the prices of crops and farm products, which could hurt the net food-importing
countries. However, in the longer run, depending  on the supply responsiveness  of developing  countries and
industrial  countries with  a comparative  advantage  in agriculture,  prices could come  down again as international
trade moves  towards a more optimal  pattern.
During the 1960s  and 1970s,  the intervention  of most governments  in agriculture  was more serious
than that in industry.  Subsidy equivalents  given to producers in the agricultural sector as a proportion of
domestic  prices  had reached 50 percent by the mid-1980s.  But this ratio, as calculated  by the OECD Secretariat,
varies greatly among countries, ranging  from about 11 percent in Australia through 50 percent in Europe to
almost 80 percent in Japan.  The total transfers from consumers  - through higher taxes to support budgetary40
outlays  and higher domestic  prices of agricultural  products  - is estimated to have reached P.50-$275  billion  per
year for the OECD area as a whole.
Deregulation of financial  markets perhaps ranks as one of the most important changes that have
taken place in the world  economy  in the 1980s,  along  with the evolutionary  changes  in Europe and the emergence
of the NIEs. It has been responsible  for the massive  movements  of capital across countries into securities  and
stock-exchange  markets  worldwide  and for the precipitous  rise in the volume of transactions  in foreign-exchange
markets in the recent years. Over the decade  of 1980s  the financial  sector in most of the industrial  countries  was
transformed from perhaps the most regulated  to one of the most competitive  sectors. Despite some differences
in the timing of the regulatory changes across countries,  the lowering  or dismantling  of the existing  barriers
against movement of capital in the major industrial  economies  has brought about a rapid surge in the volume
of financial  resources, which  were previously  trapped in local markets,  into international  markets. For example,
the net purchases of foreign  securities  by Japanese investors  rose from less than $1 billion  in 1978  to more than
$110 billion  in 1987. This process should intensify  even further as the European countries,  as a part of Project
1992,  deregulate and unify  their financial  markets over the next few  years.
As in the product industries,  the financial  services  sector has also undergone substantial  changes  to
adapt itself to changes  in market environment. Most noteworthy,  with  the help of technological  progress in the
field of microelectronics,  the recent regulatory  changes,  particularly  in the United States, have  produced a large
number of revolutionary innovations in nearly every field in that industry, ranging from new products to
organizatonal form.  The main global impact of these changes has been to make it possible for massive
movements  of capital across national boundaries to take place almost instantly. Also, a broad range of new
financial  instruments have enabled investors  to hedge against the enhanced  risks.
It has long  been recognized  that well  functioning  labor markets promote high level of employment
and prevent buildup of inflationary pressures by not allowing  excessive  wage increases above and beyond
productivity  gains.  However,  in part because of political concerns deregulation  of labor markets in industrial
countries has been slow  to come and its effects are still uncertain. For instance,  unemployment  rates in many
industrial countries remain high, in spite of the relatively  rapid growth of output in the period 1986-89. This
observation  suggests persistence  of structural  rigidities  in labor markets, particularly  in Western Europe where
both long-term and youth unemployment  rates continue  to be in double digits. Nevertheless,  some important
changes have been introduced  in the 1980s  th:t should result in a greater flexibility  of labor markets over  time.41
These changes have included  such measures  as the reduction  in the minimum  wage  relative to the average  wage
in some industrial countries and the dismantling  or scaling-back  of the wage-indexation  practices in nearly all
the industrial  countries.
Aside  from the ongoing  process  of gradually  privatizing  the publidy-owned  enterprises,  the process
of market deregulation  and competition-oriented  reforms has thus far been slow  and limited  in its scope in many
developing countries.  A  recent study shows that in a  number of developing  countries with a  significant
manufacturing base, the policy-oriented  barriers to  competition, such as regulatory controls, promotional
instruments and trade restrictions,  instituted by governments  to promote industrial  development  have instead
acted as a  major constraint to  efficient industrial development and structural changeO"  The barriers to
competition  will  have to be removed  if these developing  countries are to reach higher stages of industrialization.
Nonetheless,  a number of developing  countries,  including  the Asian NIEs and a few  socialist  economies,  which
had made serious attempts to reform their policies and remove or lower some of the regulatory  barriers to
competition in industry and trade sectors, have begun to show positive results.  In most of these countries,
private investment  has been on the rise and productivity  growth rates have accelerated.,
The overall  impact of the changes  during the 1980s  on the functioning  of the world markets seems
to have  been positive,  but the process  has often been complicated  by conflicts  among  various  interest groups (for
example,  manufacturing  vs.  banking  interests, labor vs.  management,  old industries  vs. new industries,  etc.). But
it seems that in many industries  that have  undergone  de-regulation,  important  gains in efficiency  have  been made
as a result of a higher level of competition.
While it is difficult  to establish  its linkage with the deregulation  of markets, the degree of short-
term and long-term volatiliy in prices, especially  in the financial  markets, has been significantly  higher in the
1980s  than in the 1970s  and 1960s. Although the increased  volatlity has not thus far resulted in instability  of
financial  markets, it has meant that investors  assume greater risks. Under the present macroeconomic  policy
regime  in the major industrial  countries,  volatility  in financial  prices, such as in key exchange  rates and interest
rates, is expected to continue to characterize the international economic environment  in the 1990s./  It is
I  Industrial Development  Division  (The World Bank), -Competition  Policies  for Industrializing  Countries,"
March 1989,  and in summary  form by Claudio Frischtak, "Competition  as a Tool of LDC Industrial Policy,"
Finance  and Development,  pp. 27-29,  September 1989.
l'  A review of national financial  deregulations  in the 1980s  and their implication  for the 1990s  is provided
in:  Nomura Research Institute, The World  Economy and  Fnancial Maket  in 1995,  Tokyo, 1986.42
possible  that the increased  risks  have  a more pronounced  effect on the devtloping  countries'  investors  and traders
because of their limited access  to the hedging instruments  in international  financial  markets and in the area of
international trade. 21 Thus, these countries should begin to develop and use new financial  instruments that
would  enable them to deal more effectively  with the risks, fluctuations  of commodity  prices, interest rates, and
key exchange  rates./
33  FInancdal  Conditions In the 1990s
A major uncertainty  associated  with the medium-  to long-term  outlook  - and one that could seriously  impair  the
impact of the positive  impulses  on the global  economy  - concerns  the monetary andfinancial  conditions  in the
1990s. As argued in the previous  section,  it is generally  accepted  tbat continued  volatility  of key exchange  rates
and interest rates, as in the 1980s, needs to be a part of any  realistic  scenario  for the 1990s.  Although  volatility
does not necessarily  lead to serious instability,  a key  issue is the degree of volatility  in financial  prices that can
efficiently  be  absorbed by the  existing institutions without further damaging the growth prospects of the
developing  countries. For example,  it is possible  that the emergence  of three major currency  blocks  (the dollar,
the yen, and the ECU), and a decline in the role of the US. dollar in global  transactions,  could lead to more
financial  volatility. Even in the face of close cooperation  on the part of the central banks of the key countries
to continuously  monitor and stabilize  the currency  markets,  foreign  exchange  markets have  at times shown  much
volatility  on a day-to-day  basis.
Besides the  increased volatility in  financial prices, both  the  direction and  composition of
international financial  flows have undergone a profound change during the last ten years.  The most radical
change,  however,  concerns the source of international  lending. In the 1970s  the United States was the largest
supplier of capital  to the world, and the developing  countries were the major  recipient of foreign capitaL By  the
21  Some recent studies have argued that increased long-term  volatility  of real exchange  rates could reduce
the dynamism  of international  trade.  For example,  a recent study comparing  the periods 1960-69  and 1973-84
found that the long-run volatility  of real exchange  rates could account for 20 to 30 percent of the observed
decline of the growth rate of world trade.  See P. DeGrauwe and B. de Bellefroid,  "Long-run Exchange  Rate
Volatility  and International Trade," in S.W. Arndt and JD.  Richardson,  Real-Financial  Linkages  Among Open
Economies, 1987,  MIT Press.
18J  See T. Priovolos,  "Commodity  Bonds," World Bank, Working  Paper, 1988.
I  Some  recent empirical  results  confirm  that volatility  (measured  by either mean absolute  percentage  change
or standard deviation)  in key exchange  rates and interest rates have risen sharply in the 1980s  compared with
earlier periods. For example,  see Ronald McKinnon  and David Robinson, "Dollar Devaluation,  Interest Rate
Volatility,  and the Duration of Investment," September 1989  (processed).43
second half of the 1980s  Japan and Germany had emerged as the primary suppliers of capital and the U.S.
became the largest single  borrower and, by 1988,  based on its net international  investmcnt  position, the largest
debtor country.
For the developing  countries as a group, net commercial  bank lending,  which  used to provide  about
two-thirds  of the financing  of the current account deficit in the late 1970s  and early 1980s,  has come to a near
halt and is not expected  to play a significant  role in the 1990s. On the other hand, net direct investment  which
provided only  about 10 percent of the financing  requirements of the developing  countries  in the early 1980s,  has
risen in prominence, accounting  for about 35 percent of their net financing  needs, in the second half of the
1980s.&P  However,  direct investment  flows have mainly  been directed towards  the East Asian NIEs, and have
not provided much relief to the heavily  indebted countries. This situation, however,  could change for those
developing  countries that sricceed  in introdu-ing  the needed domestic  economic  reforms and restructurings  to
attract foreign investment. The non-debt-creating  flows to the indebted countries could also increase in the
future if the macroeconomic  situation in these countries  is stabilized  and governments  succeed  in implementing
the required reforms. Since the early 1980s  private  direct investment  flows  to the 17 heavily  indebted countries
have slowed  down significantly  and an increasing  portion of the net flows  have been associated  with debt equity
conversionsAY'  Moreover,  the overall  prospects  for a significantly  higher  level of international  financial  flows  to
developing  countries in the 1990s  remain  highly  uncertain,  particularly  given the possibility  of an increase in the
demand for international  capital from the Eastern European countries and the USSR.
The external debt problem of the developing  countries  will  have to be dealt with  effectively  in order
for the development  process in these countries  to resume in the 1990s. As argued earlier, and according  to tSe
baseline projections, the relatively  high growth in the industrial countries (of about 3 percent per annum)
envisioned  for the 1990s,  is not sufficient  by itself to raise the rate of growth of per capita income significantly
in the stagnant parts of the developing  regions. This is because even a relatively  strong export performance  by
aQ/  Foreign direct investment  is playing  an increasingly  important role in both balance of payments  financing
and in  industrial development of developing countries.  Through direct investment, new technology and
management skills  can be transferred, particularly  in those countries  with reasonably  stable domestic economic
conditions,  leading  to an enhanced  productivity  growth  in the recipient  country. It also creates new employment
and can result in a greater access  to import markets  in the industrial  countries. See The World Bank, "The Role
of  Foreign Direct Investment  in Financing  Developing  Countries," Staff Study, July 1989  (processed).
t/  For a discus,sion  of the medium-term  prospects  for various sources of financing  for the indebted countries
see Ishrat Hussain and Saumya Mitra, "Future Financing  Needs  of the Highly  Indebted Countries," The World
Bank, 1989  (processed).44
the heavily indebted developing countries will not be sufficient  to substantially  reduce the net transfer of
resources out of these countries, which in the period 1986-88  amounted to more than $100 billion. In fact,
because o  the debt overhatn, for the heavily  indebted countries there is a substantial trade-off between the
benefits  A a faster pace of economic  activity  in the OECD area and the costs  of a higher level of international
rate of interest that may result from it.  Thus, a significant  reduction of debt service and a higher level of non-
debt-creating capital inflows  are what the indebted countries would need to assist them in getting back on a
higher growth pathdL'
Obviously,  the financial ;Jtuation faced by the developing  countries could worsen under a  "low
growth and high interest rate"  scenario in the industrial countries.  Section 53  below provides some rough
estimates for the size of the impact of a  'low-case" scenario.  A sigrificant deterioration in international
environment  will compound the risks to the major international  financial  centers as an increasing number of
countries find that they are unable to continue to service their external debt.  Although most international
commercial  banks  have reduced their exposure  to developing-country  debt in the recent years,  there is a growing
vulnerability  of the global  finanicial  system  to adverse  shocks. For example,  in the United States because of the
rapid increase in the share of high-risk  (high-yield)  assets, such as junk bonds and revolving  credit for consumers,
in the portfolios of commercial  banks, the banking system  has become increasinglv  _xposed  to major financial
shocks.  This issue should be  viewed against the  backdrop of globalizationi  of financial markets.  This
development,  together with securitization  and the rapid dismantling  of barriers between  various segments  of the
market, has increased  the speed with  which  economic  and political  thhocks  are transmitted  throughout  the global
financial  system. 1 /
3.4  Emerging Changes In  leratonal  Trade
Another major underlying  current in the world economy  that could ha"e important repercussions  for economic
growth  in the 1990s  is the ongoing  and prospective  institutional  changes  associated  with  intemational  Dude.  Three
M/  Rough estimates by Bank staff  suggest  that in order to raise the rate of economic  growth of the 17  Heavily
Indebted Countries by about 2.5 percentage  points (from the, 1988  rate of 1.8 percent per year to their  n.ig-
term trend rate of 45 percent per year), in addition to the domestic  policy  reforms by the countries  themselves,
the total net disbursement  to these countles must be of the order of $20  billion  per year, or more than double
its current (1988) size.
J  It is estimated that the ratio of cross-border  transactions  in securiLies  to net issues on domestc securities
narkets has increased  from 6 percent in 1980  to almost 17 percent in 1986  (see OECD,  Sunvei  face  of Sbucal
Polkices, 1989).45
prominent new developments  with potentially  important implications  for the devel  : countries in the 1990s
are: Project 1992  in Europe; the Uruguay  Round of trade negotiations  and trade reforn  in developing  countries
themselves;  and Perestroyka  in the USSR as well as major economic  and political  reforms in Eastern Europe.
World trade volume  grew by 6.7 percent per year in the period 1986-1988  in response to a higher
level of economic  activity  in the industrial  countries - more than twice  the rate in the first half of the 1980s.
However, as discussed  in Section 2, a large number of developing  countries remained unaffected  by the surge
in international  trade. This is partly because  of poor domestic  policies  (for example,  overvalued  exchange  rates,
distorted trade regimes, etc.) and lack of adequate supply capacity  in these countries and partly because the
major force behind the pickur in world  trade has been trade in manufactures,  which  still  constitutes  only  a small
portion of total exports of many developing  countries. Volume  of world  trade in manufactures  rose at an average
rate ef 8.5 percent per year in 1986-88,  and its share in total world trade had reached 72 percent by 1988.
Also, in this period, because of a significant  growth in business investment in machinery and
equipment in the industrial  countries and a number of developing  countries - as weU  as a sharp increase in the
level of direct investment,  particularly  in Asian NEEs  - trade in capital goods, which accounts for about 40
percent of total manufactures  trade, expanded even faster than manufactures  trade as a whole.
Given the prospects for continued strong machinery and equipment investment in the industrial
countries in the next decade, world trade in manufactures  is likely  to grow by about 65 to 7 percent per year,
which  is about 1 to 15 percentage points above  the trend for the 1980s. This projection  is not overly  optimistic
if the ongoing Uruguay Round of trade  negotiations and unification of the European market succeed in
significantly  reducing  the existing  trade barriers, paving  the way for a more liberal trading system.
The implication  of the trade outlook  for the developing  countries  crucially  depends on the outcome
of the global  trade negotiations,  the effects  of European market unification  and a resolution  of their external debt
problem.  The 1992  Project aims to dismantle the existing  national barriers to the free movement of labor,
capital,  goods,  and services  across  the national  boundaries  within  the European Community.  The program is set
to create the largest single market in the world, with nearly  320 million  consumers,  by the end of 1992. This
project, if successfully  implemented,  could significantly  raise the level of competition  in the European market,
particularly  for the non-European exporters,  and in markets outside Europe.  The expectations  of opening up
of such a large market has already  led to some increase in business investment  in Europe by both the European46
and transnational  companies. Nevertheless,  there will  initially  be some economic  disruption  as both national and
transnational  firms rationalize their Europe-based  operations.
While the magnitude of the overall  impact of Project 1992 on Western Europe is expected to be
significant,  its effect  on the rest of the world  is less  certain. It will  depend to some extent on the macroeconomic
policy  mix  that will  be followed  within  Europe, particularly  with respect to the possible  inflationary  consequences
of a  more rapid pace of growth.W  Macroeconometric simul-tion results indicate that as a  result of the
completion  of the internal market, the European Community's  real GDP could rise by 4.5 percent (above the
level that would prevail in the absence of Proiew 1992) in the medium term, with both productivity  and
employment  increasing  significantly. 1
The implications of Project 1992 for developing  countries will probably vary significantly  from
country to country, and from region to region.  After the completion of the market it is very likely that the
European Community  (EC) would favor products made in member countries at the expense of those from
outside the area. However, as long as external  barriers are not raised by the EC, and the growth performance
in the area is strong, the developing  countries could benefit. The impact  of a more rapid pace in investment  and
growth of agegate  demand in Europe is expected to  be positive, and significant, on the  economies of
commodity  exporting countries, while for the major exporters of manufactures the nature of the effect will
critically  depend on the extent of their access  to the European markets after 1992.A
The Uruguay  Round of Multilateral  Trade Negotiations,  which  reached its mid-term review  in late
1988,  is scheduled to end in 1990. Thus far, progress has been made in a number of areas; however,  several
other areas have proven  to be contentious,  such as, agriculture,  textiles  and clothing  (MFA),  intellectual  property
rights (TRIPS),  Lad  safeguards.  The most important deadlock has been over agriculture, as the European
L/  For a discussion  of some of tht  constraints  within the European economy and the external effects of
Project 1992  see: David  Henderson, 1992:  7he  ExtemalDimfension,  Occasional  Papers 25,  Group of Thirty, 1989.
M. Catinat, E. Donni, and  A. Italianer, "The  Completion of the Internal Market:  Results of
Macroeconomic  Model  Simulations,"  Economic  Papers,  No. 65,  Commission  of the EC, September 1988. Some
other studies have estimated much larger gains: a 5 to 7 percent rise in the real GDP or even a longer-term
acceleration in the annual growth of potential output by as much as 1 percentage  point.
W  For a set of estimates of the magnitude  of the impact of Project 1992  on Western Europe see: Alexander
Italianer, "Economic Implications  of the Completion  of the EC Internal Market," Commission  of the European
Communities,  Brussels, August 1989. Econometric simulations  by A.F. Bakhoven  ("The Completion of the
Common Market in 1992," Research Memoranda No. 56, Central Planning Bureau,  The Hague, March 1989)
show that the effect of the market completion  on the growth  of industrial  countries  outside the community  could
be negative.47
Community  and the United States were initially  unable to reach any agreement on a framework for reducing
farm support.&/  The reduction or elimination  of agricultural  subsidies in the industrial  countries could, by its
effect on the existing  pattern of demand and supply for farm prodacts, have important implications for the
developing  countries,  particularly  in the short run for those countries with serious food problems (see Section
3.2 above).  On the issues relating to trade in textiles  and clothing,  the industrial  countries have accepted the
concept of a gradual "loosening" and phaseout of the Multi-Fibre  Agreement (MFA).
An area of disagreement between industrial and developing  countries in the Uruguay Round
negotiations  is the trade-related aspects  of intellectual  property  rights. Some developiag  t.,nitries fear that with
the new rules, within the GATT framework,  they will face wicre  difficulty  in obtaining (or applying)  the latest
technology  from the industrial  countries.
!{owever,  if an agreement is reached in all the areas of negotiation, the trade among industrial
countries will be positively  affected, and the GATT framework  will be significantly  strengthened.P' The fate
of the negotiations  is critical to the outlook for the developing  countries in the 1990s. While the overall  long-
term effect of these negotiations  on the developing-country  trade is likely  to be positive,  its magnitude  is difficult
to forecast at this time, as it crucially  depends on the extent of their access to industrial-country  markets in
manufactures and agriculture, and on the prospects for transfer of technology.  Further, there  are some
uncertainties  regarding  the longer-term  implications  of Project 1992  on the world economy  and the evolution  of
trade among the developing  countries (that is, the so called South-South  trade).P'  It is important to note that
a large number of developing  countries  have, as a part of their adjustment  programs  during the 1980s,  reformed
L'i  Some of the major differences  that had surfaced among  the industrial  countries and with the developing
countries at the ministerial  meetngs in Montreal, in 1988,  particularly  in the area of farm support,  were resolved
in April, 1989  in the next round of trade talks in Geneva. At that meeting the Trade Negotiations  Committee
of the Round adopted a text by  consensus  on agriculture,  textiles  and clothing,  trade-related  aspects  of intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), and safeguards.
/  ResuWts  of an econometric study by OECD suggest that agricultural policy  liberalization  would have
positive economic effects in the OECD area over the medium term.  Model simulations  indicate that, under
certain assumptions,  the gains could be as large as three--quarters  of a percentage  point of the total GDP of the
area (OECD, "Macroeconomic  Implications  of Agricultural  LAberalization,"  note bv the Secretariat,  1988). For
an analysis of the impact of trade protection in the industrial countries on the  reavily indebted developing
countries see: Sam Laird and Julio Nogues,  "Trade Policies  and the Debt Crisis." The World Bank,  August  1988
(processed).
P  For a discussion  of the major issues in the Uruguay Round see:  J. Michael Fmger and Andrezej
Olechowski  (ed.), 7he Unmguay  Round- A Handbook  for the Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations,  The World Bank,
1987. Also see J. Michael Fmger, "The Uruguay Round. Roads to Progress," The World Bank, May 1988
(processed).48
their trade policies  to vafying  degrees. These policy  changes  have included  measures  such as reducing
impediments  to exports,  correcting  msaligned  exchange  rates and removal  of barriers  to imports. In many
countries  undertaking  trade reforms  in the 198s, progress  was  made  in correcting  exchange  rate distortions  and
reducing  impediments  to exports,  with mixed  results  on the import  side. The overall  impact  of these  policy
reforms  on export  performance,  and thereby  on economic  growth,  has been  positive.
However,  the protectionist  policies  of industrial  countries  during the 1980s  seems to  have
discouraged  further  trade policy  reforms  in a number  of developing  countries,  and there  have  even  been  some
reversals.  Growing  protectionism  in the area  of agriculture,  and a sharp  rise  in non-tariff  barriers  (NTBs)  in the
case  of textiles  and clothing  and steel have  seriously  affected  export  performance  of a number  of developing
countries.  A recent  Bank  study  estimates  that the proportion  of industrial-countries  imports  affected  by  NTBs
doubled  between  1966  and 1986,  to more  thin 40 percent.A/
The  medium-  to long-term  consequences  of the ongoing  reforms  in Eastern  Europe  and the  USSR,
because  of the prospective  demand  for much  higher  level  of imports  from these  countries,  are bound  to be
positive  for the major  exporters  of manufactures  in the developed  and the developing  groups. Because  of the
existing  trade and financial  channels  and geographical  proximity,  the impact  is expected  to be particularly
favorable  for  the Western  European  economies.  But the magnitude  of the  initial  effect  is expected  to be rather
modest  since  the USSR  (and the other  reformers  in Eastern  Europe)  may  be facing  a severe  foreign  exchange
constraint,  and because  the  Soviet  trade  relations,  though  significant,  are not  yet  well  developed.A  For  example,
in 1988  the share of the USSR  in world  merchandise  trade  was  only  3.9  percent  compared  with  more  than 11.5
percent  for Germany,  which  has an economy  one-third  smaller  in size  than that of the USSR. In this context,
a major  issue  that could  seriously  challenge  the developing  countries  in the 1990s  is the  enormous  potential  Cm
terms  of human  capital,  diversity  of natural  resources,  and large  internal  market)  of the IJSSR  and some  of the
socialist  countries  (including  those  in the developing  country  group)  in the area of in. snational  trade and in
competing  for external  fimancial  resources  from the industrial  countries,  particularly  in the form of direct
investment.
IW  S. Laird  and A. Yeats,  -Trends  in Nontariff  Barriers  of Developed  Countries:  1966  to 1986,"  The  World
Bank,  PPR Working  Paper No.  137.
t/  For an anabsis  of trade prospects  of the USSR,  in light  of Perestroyka,  see: Bela  Balassa,  "Reflections
on Perestroyka  and the Foreign  Economic  Ties  of the USSR,"  World  Bank,  PPR Working  Paper 149,  January
1989.49
3S  Rapid  Face  of  Technologlcal  Change
Since  the mid-m970s,  there  has been  a vast number  of new  innovations  and a sigoificant  acceleration  in the rate
of techncal  change.  These  new technologies  have  had widespread  applications  ranging  from banking  and
telecommunication  to manufacturing  and pollution  abatement. A large  number  of new  products  and services
have  appeared  in the markets  in a relatively  short  period  of time,  with  a major  impact  on international  trade.
As intra-industrn  competition  has intensified  internationally,  competing  firms have  tried to gain comparative
advantage  by demanding  and utilizing  the most up to date technology,  both to control  production  costs  and to
improve  upon  their product  characteristics.
Technological  advance  has always  been a key determinant  of economic  growth.M(  However,  in
conjunction  with  the other  trends  at work  in the  global  economy,  and also  due to some  distinctive  features  of its
own,  the current  phase  of technological  progress  portends  to havc  important  economic  and  social  consequences
in both the industrial  and developing  countries  over  the coming  decades.  This is mainly  because  the dominant
emerging  "clusters"  of new  technology  are in the nature  of new  technologicalpapgrs in that their potential
scope  far transcends  sectoral  boundaries  and encompasses  almost  the entire  production  system  of an economy.
Their possible  effects  include  generation  of new products  and industrial  sectors,  transformation  of existing
methods  of production,  further  blurring  of the distinction  between  manufacturing  and services,  and radical
changes  in the terms  of international  competition  and comparative  advantage.  In this subsection,  the broad
contours  of  the  new  technological  frontier  are  briefly  described  followed  by  an account  of the  changes  engendered
by them in the industrial  countries.  The  subsection  concludes  with  an assessment  of their potential  impact  on
the developing  countries.
The most important of these technology  clusters is the microelectronic  information  and
communication  technology,  foilowed  by the new  biotechnology  and the new materials  technologies.  These
technologies  are at different  stages  of invention,  innovation,  and diffusion,  but a large number  of important
innovations  are well  past the invention  stage  and are in the process  of diffusion  so that it is possible  to evaluate
their impacts.
P  This issue  is discussed  in more  detail  in Secion  4. A summary  of different  theories,  relating  technical
change  to longer-term  productivity  growth  is given  in C. Freeman,  "Technical  Change  and Long-term  Economic
Growth,"  paper  prepared  for  The  World  Bank  Seminar  on  Technology  and  Long-term  Economic  Growth,  1988.
Also  see M.  Abramovitz,  "Catching  Up,  Forging  Ahead  and  Falling  Behind,"  loumal  of Economic  Hiryr  1986,
pp. 385-406.50
The most visible,  advanced  and best analyzed  of these clusters  is the microeleAronics  technology,
which includes, on  the  one  hand, information technologies related  to  storing, retrieving, analyzing and
transmitting  information  (computers,  telecommunications  equipment,  and microelectronic  components),  and on
the other, application  of microelectronics-based  technologies  to manufacturing  covering  robotics, CAD, CAM,
computer  numerically  controlled  machine  tools,  flexible  manufacturing  systems  (FMS),  and Just-In Time Systems
(JITS).9/  They are making radical changes in the service sector (including  banking, consultancy,  healthcare,
and education), and primary industries, utilities, and agriculture.  In addition, due to  the supercomputer
technology,  a whole new range of R&D has become possible. Complex  problems in both natural and social
sciernces  are now analyzed using computer simulations. In sum, the impact of microelectronics  on modem
economy and society  is as radical as that of electrification  in the early parts of the century.
The new biotechnology (as opposed to  the traditional biotechnology)  is  based on  practical
applications  of recent advances in diverse fields, such as, molecular biology,  biochemistry,  microbiology,  and
chemical  engineering,  and involves  use of living  organisms to rredify plants and animals and development  of
microorganisms  for specific  purposes. This is the cluster that is in the earliest stage of development. So far its
primary impact has been on healthcare, and developments  of revolutionary  proportions are expected soon in
chemicals  and food industr;es,  agriculture, and animal husbandry,  and in the next stage, in pollution control,
waste recycling,  mining, and energy.
The new materials  technology  includes  a host of product  and process  innovationms  aimed  at replacing
traditional materials.  The product innovations  include inorganic materials such as ceramics (including high
temperature superconducting  materials), new cements,  metals and alloys;  organic materials such as polymers,
and nonmetallic  composites. New process innovations  include production  techniques of forming close to fnal
shape, and join technologies. The trend has been away from petroleum feedstocks and metals and towards
polymers  and ceramics  essentially  made up of common  elements,  such as oxygen,  silicon,  and calcium. Further,
it appears that the eventual processing  technologies  will be relatively  less resource-intensive  and adaptable to
local conditions. These innovations,  thus, have a potential  for expanding  the production  possibility  frontier even
for countries not endowed  with scarce natural resources.
;  M.G.K.  Menon,  et al, (eds.) Technical  Change:  Enhancing  the Benefits,  Volumes  I and II, Commonwealth
Secretariat, 1985 and Janet Muroyama and H. Guyford Stever (eds.) Globalizaton  of Technology,  National
Academy Press, 1987.51
Almost all industries and businesses are  forced to reconsider their product lines, production
technologies, locational decisions, marketing strategies, research and  development activities,  and  even the
organizational  form.W Within the manufacturing  sector, new and fast-growing  industries are emerging, some
sectors are experiencing  sharp declines,  and some industries  considered mature and declining  are witnessing
potential revival. Manufacturing  and services  are becoming  more interdependent with  an increase  in the service
content of manufactured  goods ("dematerialization  of manufactures") and increased  tradability  of many  service
activities  ("industrialization  of services"). Further, the technological  trends tend to mingle  with the other major
forces at work in the global  economy  described  in the paper to markedly  change  the economic  environment  and
to necessitate  new tools for economic  and financial  management.
In many industries, the  parameters which used to define competitiveness  have been altered.
Increased globalization  of trade has reduced the advantages  conferred  by a large domestic  market. New  methods
using  multipurpose  plants and modular product designs  have been able to bring down the minimum  economic
size of production  units and have been more effective  in responding  to increased  product diversity  and short life
span.  It is stiUl  difficult  to pinpoint the new factors that are crucial in determining patterns of comparative
advantage;  one can only characterize  them broadly as capability  to evolve  new ways  of doing business to fully
exploit  technological  and market opportunities. What is certain,  however,  is that the prospective  realignment  of
trade and specialization  on the global scale will put pressure on the existing  multilateral arrangements in the
1990s.  As production  process  becomes  more segmented  and more complex,  it will  become more likely  that trade
policy  changes  will increasingly  have unintended  side effects.
The pattern of generation  and diffusion  of innovations  itself  has changed  radically.  The technological
leadership in generic innovations  has passed from chemical  and engineering  industries  to electronics  and allied
industries. This changes  the nature of intersectoral  complementaries.  The innovation  process itself  has acquired
an international  dimension,  as evidenced  by increased  tendency  for international  patenting;  and new national and
global inter-company  alliances  representing different types of foreign  participation  have emerged.3O
The pace of technological  change and its diffusion  is quickening  in  a large number  of sectors  leading
to an increase in costs and risks of research and development  activities  as well as in uncertainty  for horizontally
S  For a detailed discussion  of the trends and the implications  for policy, see OECD (1988): Sb'uctural
Adjustnent and Economic  Perfomtance,  especially,  Chapter 6.
N/  See Ashoka Mody: "Changing  Firm Boundaries: Technology  Sharing  Aliances," The World Bank, 1989
(processed), for an analysis  of recent trends in technology-related  alliances  between firms.52
linked  industries. The technological  life  cycle  of procese  and products  has become briefer, speeding  up the rate
of obsolescence  of the existing  stock of both physical  and human capital. While past experience  indicates that
for industrial  countries aggregate  technological  unemployment  is unlikely,  labor displacement  in specific  sectors
and specific  skill categories  would  be unavoidable.W
For the developing  countries the technological  changes  under way  hold out new promises  and new
challenges  in the 1990s,  depending  crucially  on the international  economic and financial  environment  and the
domestic  state of affairs.3' On the one hand, as indicated  above,  many of the emerging  technology  clusters  have
a genuine  potential for being harnessed to address  the problems of the poor nations through their contributions
in agriculture,  rural development,  food, cheaper and cleaner  energy sources,  healthcare, and education. On the
other hand, they can radically  change the existing  patterns of comparative  advantage  against many developing
countries, particularly  those with low or dedining investment  ratios and relatively  high illiteracy  rates and low
skill levels  in the late 1980s. There is growing  empirical  evidence  that "human capital" not only  positively  affects
the longer-term  growth potential  of an economy,  but that it also raises  the "efficiency"  (in terms of growth  yield)
of investment  in machinery and equipment.E'
The product and process  innovations  relating  to automation  can undermine  the current comparative
advantage  of developing  countries in labor-intensive  and technologically  mature activities  (for example,  textiles,
clothing,  footwear,  assembly  of electronic products),  and may result in these being relocated to the high income
countries.  This trend will be exacerbated if protectionist tendencies are strengthened in the high income
countries. Also, the innovations  in new materials and biotechnology  has reduced the demand for the traditional
exports of some developing  countries (for example,  copper, steel, cotton).
Some of the new technologies,  once they become established  in manufacturing  practices,  have the
potential for reducing the average skdll  requirement.  This "deskilling" effect may bave a positive  effect on
/  For details  on employment  effects on new technologies,  see R. Cyert and D. Mowery,  (eds.), Technology
and Unemployment,  National  Academy Press, 1987.
;J  For details see Carl J. Dahlman: "Impact of Technological  Change  on industrial  Prospects for the LDCs,"
The World Bank, [988 (processed) and M.G.K Menon, et al, cited earlire.
ii/  The role of human capital accumulation  as a source  of economi-  growth is being investigated  intensively.
See, for example,  Paul M. Romer, "Increasing  Returns and Long-Run  Growth," Joumal of Polikal  Economy,
Vol. 94 (October 1986): pp. 1002-37,  Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "On the Mechanics  of Economic  Development,"
Journal  of Monetary  Economkcs,  VoL  22 (1988): pp. 3-42,  and Ichiro Otani and Delano Villanueva,  "Theoretical
Aspects of Growth in Developing  Countries," IMF Staff Papeis, VoL  36, No. 2 (June 1989): pp. 307-342.53
developing  countries  by relieving  the skills  shortage constraint. Most of the developing  countries,  however,  lack
the scientific  infrastructure needed to achieve  the optimal diffusion  of the new technologies.
The expanding  global  trade and the increasing  range of new products  may  create some niches  which
can be exploited  by the more technologically  advanced  developing  countries,  which  include  the East Asian NIEs
and also a second tier of developing  countries. But even these countries may be hampered if there were to be
increased protectionism  and any non-trade barriers to acquisition  of technology.
The heavily  indebted developing  countries which  had depended in the past on imported embodied
technology  may not be able to maintain  and update their technology  because of the high  likelihood  of continued
financial  difficulties  well into the 1990s. Since the new technology  is embodied in the new vintages of capital
goods imported by the developing  countries,  these countries'  access to new technology  is critically  dependent on
their ability  to generate the needed foreign  exchange. If the levels  of net financial  flows  to developing  countries
continues to remain low in the 1990s,  many low and middle  income countries may altogether lose access  to the
new technologies  during the net  decade.  Thus, continuation  of the present trends could lead to a further
widening  of the "technology  gap" in favor of the industrial  countries and a few leading  developing  economies.
3.6  Demographic  Factors
Another key concern for the 1990s  is the projected evolution  of population  growth in the different parts of the
world. Demographic  models suggest  that, mainly  because of the continuing  decline  in fertility rates, a further
significant  drop in the population growth of the industrial  countries is to be expected  in the next two decades,
from the average of 0.5 percent per year in the 1980s  to only  0.3 percent in the 1990s  and to almost zero in the
first decade of the 21st century. If these forecasts  are correct,  they would  imply  a rapid aging  of their population,
a significant  increase in the ratio of dependents  to the working  age population  (dependency  ratio), a further shift
in the balance of world population away from the industrial countries, and major social and  economic
consequences.
Aging will have important implications for  demand for  social services and  the  pattern  of
consumption,  saving  and investment,  and for wage formation  and employment,  in the industrial  countries in the
coming decade.  These effects will be more pronounced in countries such as Germany and Japan, which are
expected to experience  sharp increases in their dependency  ratios in the l990s.  In the long run, the level of
savings  could be adversely  affected as the share of the aged (retirees) in the population begins to rise.  Lower54
savings  and higher consumption  levels  could lead to higher real interest rates and lower investment,  thus a lower
growth of potential output. The tightening  of labor markets may lead to a sharp increase in wages,  unless  there
were to be a significantly  higher level of movement  of labor from countries with low  wage and high population
growth to high-wage  countries. Movement  of labor could be very important in Europe, as a result of Project
1992  and the recent developments  in Eastern Europe. Because  of these expected  demographic  changes,  the role
of new production technologies,  particularly  in the area of robotics and automation, will become increasingly
critical to the determination of growth and inflation  in the industrial  countries. However,  the ultimate impact
of a lower population growth rate on an economy  is uncertain. Even though an older work force is generally
more experienced  and perhaps even more productive  than a younger  one, the net effect  of the expected  change
in population growth on capital formation and technical  progress is ambiguous/ 1.
On the other hand, in many developing  countries,  particularly  the poorer ones, the rapid pace of
population growth is expected to continue weil into the 1990s,  albeit at a moderately slower pace than in the
1980s  - from the present rate of 2.0 percent per year to 1.8 percent per year in the next decade.V  The most
important implication  is that in a large number of these countries,  youth will remain by far the largest segment
of the population. Some preliminary  estimates show that the economies  of these countries must grow  at rates
significantly  above 4 percent per year, in order to absorb the new additions  to their labor force.
A major  challenge  facing  the developing  countries  is to raise their labor  productivity  while absorbing
the expected  new entries into the wc-- force in the 1990s. This  challenge  is particularly  serious  in Africa,  where
population growth rates are very high and productivity  levels  have been declining  since the later part of the
1970s.  In addition, substantial resources will have to be mobilized to increase food production and water
supplies, and to  protect the  environment, which has come under  severe pressure from the  increases in
population.P/ In this context,  the role of human capital investment  will  become even  more important as a major
determinant of long-term growth  in the developing  countries. The level and quality  of human  capital investments
DJ  See OECD, "Aging Population: Implications  for Public Fmance  and the Macroeconomy. Summary  and
Main Issues," note by Se&etariat,  September 1988  (processed).
i9  For a discussion  of the relationship between population growth and development  see Nancy  Birdsall,
"Economic Analysis  of Rapid Population  Growth," 7he World  Bank Research  Observer,  January 1989.
/  For a summary  of the main economic  issues  confronting  the developing  countries  with a rapid population
growth see: Allen C. Kelley,  "Economic Consequences  of Population  Change in the Third World," Journal of
Economic Literature, December 1988,  pp. 1685-1728.55
in these countries will  have to rise significantly  over the next decade in order to deal not only  with  the rapid rise
in their youth population  but also to enable their labor force to work with  the new generation of technologies.
3.7  Envlromnental Issues
The environmental  prospects  for the 1990s  and beyond  will be the result of the interplay  of a number of ongoing
trends, the outcome of which could have important implications  for the long-run  growth prospects of both the
developing  and industrial countries. However,  because of the complex  nature of environmental  problems,  and
the uncertainty  about the precise nature of linkages  between environment  and economic  activity,  it is difficult  to
quantify  the effects of a deterioration of the environment,  or of the policy  measures taken to reverse it, on long-
term growth potential of the world economy.
Fundamental trends that increase the pressure on the environment are growth of population,
industrial  and agricultural  production, and energy  consumption  leading to increased  production  of regional and
global pollutants (implicated  in phenomena  such as damage to the ozone layer,  global  warming,  and acid rain),
deforestation, and desertification. These trends are likely  to be practically  irreversible  in the near future.A
The trends that go towards mitigating  the pressure are increased regulation  at national and international  levels
representing a trade-off between cleaner environment  and measured economic  growth, and increasing  use of
cleaner production systems  built around new technologies. The more rapidly  growing  industries  and the higher
income countries will be better able to shift production  techniques and to afford the initial huge outlays.
As discussed  later in the subsection,  based on the experience  of the last 15 years, control of local
pollutants  is likely  to result in only  a modest slowdown  in the pace of economic  growth  in the conventional  sense
in the industrialized  countries over the next decade. More importandy,  given the enormous complexity  of the
ecosystem, there  are bound to  be nonlinearities and  discontinuities,  which, if encountered, would cause
irreversible changes;  fer example,  beyond a critical threshold,  as yet unknown,  further buildup of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere  may radically  alter the global  climate. Furthermore,  environmental  quality  in most parts
of the developing  world is likely  to deteriorate. There is also the likelihood  of greater political  tension between
the developing  countries and the industrial  countries,  as the former group tries to develop  and grow in the face
Munn, R.E,  "Environmental  Prospects for the Next Century  Implications  for Long-Term Policy  and
Research Strategies," Technological  Forecasdng  and Social Change,  VoL  33, 1988: pp. 203-218.56
of tight financial  constraints,  and the latter group  strives  to impose  and enforce  its environmental  rules and
regulations  internationally.
A discussion  of environmental  issues  as  they  bear  upon  the  global  outlook  is complicated  by  the  fact
that industrialized  countries  and developing  countries  differ  in their perspective  on the enviroment. In the
developed  countries,  concern  about  the state of the environment  has  become  part of the mainstream  political
and economic  processes.  Initially,  the developing  countries  showed  only  a peripheral  interest  in these  issues,
seeing  the environmental  problems  as by-products  of the growth  process,  of concern  only to the affluent
countries.  This  view  began  to change  in the mid-seventies  both as a result  of action  by grassroots  organizations
in the developing  countries  themselves  and by international  organizations.  By  now,  it is politically  acceptable  to
consider  environmental  effects  of large  scale  developmental  projects.  But it has also  become  increasingly  clear
that preventing  environmental  degradation  in the developing  countries  is closely  tied to alleviating  poverty.  It
is  now  recognized  that environmental  degradation  results  both  from  developmental  activities  and  actions  induced
by the very  lack  of development§,  as well  as from lack  of well  defined  property  rights.
Table 9 lists the important  environmental  concerns  of the developed  and developing  countries.
Issues  which  are considered  to be of particular  importance  in each case  are highlighted  in bold. The major
enviromental  issues  in the  developing  countries  are briefly  described  below,  followed  by an analytical  discussion
of the macroeconomic  impact  of pollution  control  measures  in the developed  countries.
The ambient  air quality  in many  of the major  metropolitan  areas  of the low-  and middle-income
counbies is very  poor. The major sources  of the pollution  are domestic  burning of coal and firewood,  automobile
ei ssions,  emissions  from  industrial  establishments,  and  combustion  in thermal  power  plants. Indoor  air  quality
is perhaps  more severe,  with  speci&i-  impact  on the poor. Air quality  in rural areas  is also worsening  due to
large  scale  clearing  of natural  vegetation  by burning  and the use of firewood  in enclosed  spaces. Fresh  water
scarcity  is expected  to become  worse  in the developing  countries  affecting  human  consumption  and irrigation.
The tropical  forest  resources  ar_ being  depleted  rapidly. The main  causes  of deforestation  are to meet the
demand for new agricultural  land, timber and fuelwood.
Agricultural  land,  especially  of marginal  land,  is being  degraded-by  intensive  culivation  and the
resulting  soil erosion,  changes  in land-use  for large-scale  infrastructures  and mining,  and salinization  and
sodicadton.
92Peter  Bartelmus,  EhRnvinment  wznd  Development,  Boston.  Allen  & Unwin,  L986.57
TABLE  9.  MaJor Environmental  Concerns  of Devdoped  & Developing  Countries
lnvnmen  ce  Developed  counitres  Develpingcounies
L  Naturalenvloment
A.  Air  Air poltion  Air pollution Ibigeities.
B.  Lad,  soi  and mineral  Soil lss  and deterioration;  dumping  of waste;  Soll  erosion and degradation,  deserilca.
resoures (incL  ener)  risk of radioactie  otaminaton  fom  nudear  tion
production
C  Water coure  Freshwate sort;  degradation of rcres-  Freshwater  shorte
tonal resources
D.  Natuli  vegetadon  I1u  of genetic  resources;  endangered  species  Deforestation  (esp. of tropical forests);
loss of gnetic resources;  endagered
species
E.  Natural  disasters  Floods;  earthquakes  Floods;  dug  storms;  earthquakes
IL  Human-made environment and living  conditions
A.  Blpducte  ystems  nLss  of cropland to urban cpraw pests and  Loss and degradalton of amble land;
pest resistance; ontamination  of crops and  pest  and pest resistance;  water shortage;
fs  .ver-exploitation  of fishing  ground  dis-  pressr  on fish population (overfishinag
ruption of niountain,  wetland,  fieshwntcr  (esp.  poDutonX  impacts  of fiwood  consump-
from add rains and eutrophication)  and coastal  tion food contamination;  post-harst  los-
ecosystem  ses
B  Habitat  Urban sprawl; noise  Marginal  selements  (urban migration,
whoa grwth)
C  Health  cer,  genetic  and cdronic  effects  of toxic  sub-  mal-nuorinffectitloas  and parasitic
stances  diseases
Source: Adapted from Peter Bartelmur: Environment  and Development.58
The cities of developing  countries are fast increasing in area and population.  The most serious
aspect of the urban growth is the increase of marginal settlements  in and around the cities, encompassing  as
much as a third of the urban population, made up mainly of squatters living in makesnift housing without
adequate sanitation,  water, and transportation and education  facilities. The growth of urbanization appears to
be primarily  through the natural growth of urban population  with the rural-urban migration contributing  to it.
It turns out that cities are the areas of greatest transform.-ion of the environmentAP  In addition  to conventional
pollution problems in  their most concentrated forms, urban growth leads to climatological,  hydrological,
geomorphological,  and vegetational  modfications.
In the high-income  counries, is a result of environmental  legislation,  pollution  control expenditures
became  significant  in the early seventies,  and after reaching  a peak in the mid-seventies,  have,  since  then, tended
to decline  in relation to the level of economic  activity.  Based  on rough data collected  by OECD for six  countries,
in the early 1980s,  these expenditures  have ranged between 0.4 to 0.8 percent of GDPA.
Increasingly,  there have been studies investigating  the impact of pollution control investment on
macroeconomic  aggregates  such as output, inflation,  productivity,  and employmentA. An OECD study, using
macroe *onometric  simulations,  found that the effects of increased  pollution control expenditure  on the growth
of output was indeterminate, ranging  from a positive  impact  of 1.5 percent per year (Norway  over 10 years) to
a negative  impact of 1 percent per year (United States over 18 years). Other studies, however,  have found the
effect on inflation to be unambiguously  unfavorable  with an annual increase of from 03  to 0.6 percentage
points.A. The aggregate  impact on productivity  was found to be slightly  negative: about 8 to 12 percent of the
productivity  decline in the industrial countries since 1973 appears to be  attributable to  pollution control
expenditures.O
/  See A. Gupta,  Ecokgy and Development  in the Third  World,  London: Routledge,  1988.
d5  OECD, The  Macroeconomic  Impact of Environmental  Ependitures, 1985.
OJ  As these studies are aggregative  in nature and the quality  of data available  is highly  deficient,  they have
difficulty  in isolating  the effect  of envLronmental  regulation  from the effects  of a host of other factors  which  have
affected  the economic  performance  in the same  period (such  as the rise in the energy  prices, demographic  shifts,
etc.), and as such, the results should be seen as indicative  only.
-'  A study by DRI using the same methodology  gives comparable results for the United States.  See Data
Resources,  Inc. "The Macroeconomic  Impact of Federal Pollution  Control Programs," 1981.
!V  See Christiansen,  Gregory  B., and Robert H. Haveman,  "The Contribution of Environmental  Regu ations
to the Slowdown  in Productivity  growth," Joumal of Environmental  Economics and Management,  December
1981,  pp. 381-390.59
Thus, environmental  expenditures,  to the extent that they are measurable, do not appear to have
been a significant  drag on economic  growth,  so far. In the future also, barring  major regulatory  escalation,  their
impact can be expected  to continue to be modest for a number of reasons. For one, these expenditures  have
generally  been declining  in real terms as percentages  of total investment. Secondly,  the regulatory approach has
been  shifting from a  control-and-command  mode tovards  one based  on  economic incentives.  Further,
technological  changes  in pollution  control equipment  also  reduce compliance  costs relative  to the first  generation
end-of-line  (add-on) type of equipment. Fmally,  evidence  available  from some rudimentary  disaggregated  studies
indicate  that for some industries  the new capital  introduced  as a response  to environmental  regulation  and higher
energy prices have resulted in overall  gains in productivity.  Fmally,  technological  change, especially  in the
field  of biotechnology,  may  make it possible  to introduce  non-polluting  production  processes,  and new treatment
techniques. It must also be noted that most of the benefits associated  with pollution  control measures are not
reflected  in measured (marketed) output. Quantitative  assessment  of these benefits (or increases  in welfare) is
quite difficult  and controversial. Nevertheless,  some studies have found that "benefits" due to air and water
pollution  control for five industrial countries ranged between 0.6 and 2.3 percent of their GDP.5
Three qualifications  may  be added to the somewhat  sanguine  outlook  for industrial  countries  given
above: Simulation results suggest that the extent of disruption in economic activity,  caused by the need for
additional investment in pollution control, depends on whether the fiscal and monetary policy  mechanisms
encourage savings  to increase substantially  and on a sustained  basis over  historical  levels.  Secondly,  the new-
source bias (that is, more stringent controls, resulting in higher compliance  costs, for new as opposed to old
sources) present in environmental  regulation,  for example in the United States, acts as an incentive  to prolong
the life  of old capital stock and is a disincentive  against  new investment. Fmally,  there are three sources  of najor
environmental  problems which can intrude in the process of economic growth:  siting of hazardous waste,
controlling the type and amount  of toxic substances entering the economic life, and the  issue of global
pollutants.
h  OECD, 1985,  cited earlier.
2  Myrick  A. Freeman, "Some Issues in the Estimation  and Use of Benefits  Measures," report prepared for
the Council  on EnvLronmental  Quality,  Washington,  D.C.,  February 1980;  and OECD,  Benefits  of Environmental
Policies  as Avoided Damage: Summay State of Art and  Ccnclusion,  Paris, 1983.
II/  Ridker, Ronald G. and William  D. Watson, "Long-run  Effects of Environmental  Regulation", in Peskin,
Henry M., Paul R. Portney, and Allen V. Kneese, (eds.), Environmental  Regladon  and the US. Economy
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University  Press for Resources for the Future, 1981).60
3.8  AvallabLUty  of Materlal Resources
Over the past tvi  decades, the so-called 'growth debate" (that is, pro-growth  versus zero-growth)  has been
mainly  concerned  with  the  possibility  (as well  as the desiability)  of sustained  economic  growth  in the conventional
sense'/.  As regards the sustainability  of growth issue,  the adequacy  of natural resources  in the face of growing
population and income,  has generally  served  as the dividing  line. More recently,  employing  a materials balance
model to synthesize  economic  principles and physical  laws (such as the second  law of thermodynamics),  it has
been argued that the very  long-run  optimal  path of production  and consumption  leads to a stationary  state with
zero growthW. While the debate has demonstrated the inevitability  of evental  transition to a zero-growth
society,  the questions  have become focussed  on the time horizon and the adequacy  of market mechanisms  and
other modern institutions to cope with the impact of resource scarcity.  Considering  the main factors which
counteract the growth retardation caused by scarcity  of inputs, namely, tuchnological  progress and substitution
possibilities,  within  our forecast  horizon  of 10  to 12  years,  generalized  resource scarcity  is unlikely  to be a serious
constraint on economic  growth.  The two major problem areas are:  (a) the poverty-related  issue of unequs
access to food and agricultural  resources manifesting  itself  in chronic  food insecurity  and continual occurrence
of local famines;  and (b) the vulnerability  of the world  economy  to uncertainty  of supply  conditions  and volatility
of prices in markets for conventional  energy  sources and other strategic minerals.
The global economic projections  presented in Section 5 below are based on detailed simulation
studies using individual  models  for selected commodities  maintained  by the International Commodity  Markets
0  The quintessential  anti-growth  platform is the Club of Rome Report (see Meadows,  D.H., et aL, 7The
Luimts  to Growth,  New York, Universe Books,  1972,  and the follow-up  in Meadows,  D.L, et al, Dynamics  of
Growth  in a Finite World,  Cambridge:  Wright-Allen  Press, 1974). In this connection,  also  see Daly,  HE., Steady-
State Economics, San Francisco:  Freeman and Company,  1977,  and Barney,  G.0.,  The Global  2000  Report  to
the Prsident of the US.: Entering  the 21st Cntwy,  New  York, Pergamon Press, 1980. The predominant  name
associated  with the standard pro-growth  view  is Hermann Kahn (see Kahn,  H., W. Brown,  and L. Martel, The
Nex 200 Years:A Scenaio forAmeica  and the World,  New York. William  Morrow, 1976,  and Simon, J1. and
H. Kahn, The Resourcefid  Earth A Response  to Global 2000, New York: Blackwell,  1984.  For a balanced
evaluation, see Tietenberg, T., Environmental  and Naunil  Resources Economics, Glenview,  Illinois: Scott,
Foresman and Company,  Second Edition, 1988.
w  See Ayers, R.U. and S.M. Miller, "The Role of Technological  Change," Joumal of Envionmtl
Economics  and  Management,  VoL  7 (December,  1980). The materials balance  model  was introduced  by Kneese,
A.N, R.U. Ayers,  and R.G. d'Arge,  Economics  and  the Environment.A  Matesiali  BalazxceApproach,  Washington,
D.C., Resources for the Future, 1970.
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Division  of the Bank2V. In this section we discuss  the general supply  outlook for agricultural  resources, energy
resources and non-fuel minerals.
Considering  that a very  large segment  of world  population is malnourished2 1, even after spending
a major part of working time on food producdon, the availability  of food has been a  major drag on labor
productivity  (and thus output growth) in large parts of the developing  world.  This is being exacerbated by
various factors mentioned in the section on environment,  such as marginal cultivation,  desertification,  soil-
erosion, and conversion  to cash crops.  Many analysts agree, however,  that the available  and potential food
supplies  in the l990s are more than adequate for a much larger population  than today's-M.  Thus, the world food
problem is not one of absoilute  global scarcity,  but of inequitable  distribution,  internationally  and within  nations,
of income, of land, and of comple.-entary inputs such as water and irrigation facilities,  fertilizers,  agricultural
implements, and technical  knowhow. This contrast of misery  amidst plenty  is likely  to characterize the global
scene in the foreseeable future unless  serious efforts towards changes  in institutions,  price and credit policies,
and distribution  of landholdings  are undertaken in the developing  countries and the massive  infusion  of required
capital outlay  is forthcoming.
Due to increased  agricultural  productivity  and slow  growth of effective  demand, real international
prices of food products have  generally  been declining  (except  in the early 1970s  and only  episodically  in 1984  and
recently  in 1988). The prospects  for the 1990s  are also for continued  improvement  in farm production  technology
and decline in real price of food grains. However,  for food-importing  developing  countries,  the domestic  price
of food will depend on the future price of foreign exchange. Given negative  resource flows and adverse  terms
of h  de, the cost of food imports  could rise even  if international  prices are declining,  thus reducing  food available
t^  Iouseholds.WI
WJ4  See IECCM, PWce  fPvspects  for Major  Pnmary Commodits,  (in three volumes),  Report No. 814/88,
Washington,  D.C.: The World Bank, November 1988.
W'  According  to 1980  data, more than a third of the total population  of the developing  countries (excluding
China) are under-nourished  and about 90 percent of them live  in South  Asia and Sub-Saharan  Africa. See The
World Bank,  Poveny  and  Hunger:  Issues  and Opdons  for Food Secun(y  in Developing  Counties, The World Bank,
M86.
Iw  Projections  to the year 2000  for food supplies  indicate that "world food production  is likely  to keep pace
with effective  global  demand, perhaps even at a lower price," Ibid. pp. 13-27. There are, however,  some other
studies  which  tend to be less optimistic  about the food prospects  for the 1990s. For example,  seef  Lester Brown,
"The Changing  World Food Prospects: The Nineties  and Beyond,"  Worldwatch  Paper 83, October 1989.
Q  World Bank 1986,  cited earlier.
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The two oil-price shocks of the last decade have brought about a structuisi change in the world
economy. Production systems  predicated upon the availability  of cheap and plentiful energy  have given way to
those geared to energy  efficiency.  World energy  consumption  grew at annual rates of 5.8 percent between 1961
and 1970,  while  the rate between 1970  and 1986  was less than half of that (2.5 percent) reflecting  higher prices,
substitution  of other sources  of more energy  and conservation.  It is assumed  that further improvements  in energi
economy  will be more modest and the global energy consumption  by the year 2000  is expected to be about 37
percent higher than the 1986  level,  representing an annual increase of 23 percent.  f
A major trend in the composition  of energy sources  in recent times has been the marked increase
in the share of primary electricity  mainly  reflecting  the expansion  of nuclear energy  in many parts of the world.
The share of electricity  in the total crergy market is likely to increase in most countries albeit at a lower rate
than in the seventies  and early  eighties  because  of the environmental  concerns  posed by nucLa.sr  energy. Another
recent and significant  trend has been the expansion  of natural gas supplies  in the centrally  plained economies
and in developing  countries; this is expected  to continue well into the future.  f
The Persian  Gulf  region  will  continue  to be the predominant  supplier  of oiL  Supj.-.y  o.'  r
the industrial  countries  are expected  to limit  the supplies  from non-OPEC  sources and the quantiL.  o  uv  .
oil from the centrally  planned economies  is expected to decline beyond 1995. While the relativ, '  vftortr eiU
prices expected to prevail in the early nineties should stimulate exploration in the non-OPEC oil-exponing
developing  countries,  their exports are likely  to level off. Thus, given the projected 1.4  percent annual growth
in oil demand, the OPEC share in world production  (which  had reached a peak of 54 percent in 1973  and had
fallen to 32 percent in 1986)  would  reach nearly 40 percent ht the year 2000.
The most promising  among the curreutly experimental sources of energy are solar and nuclear
fusion. They are not, however,  likely .o be significant  contributors to world commercial  energy supply before
the neLl century.
In cum,  given the tightness of supply  vis-a-vis  demand, energy is an area prone to unpredictable
excogenous  shocks,  which  could be sizeable,  and which  would  have predictable  consequences  for the oil-importing
and the oil-exporting  countries. Thus, although  global  economic  growth is not likely  to encounter a bottleneck
in energy supply,  the downside  risk remains of volatile oil markets causing  a serious shortage of conventional
energy and threatening economic growth in many parts of the world.  In the face of continuing financial63
difficulties,  the consequence of a major adverse  energy-price  shock for the oil-importing  developing  countries
would  be severe.
As regards non-energy  minerals,  broad factors  that increase  the level  of consumption  are population
growth and income growth. Environmental  and social  concerns  act as constraints  on the exploitation  of mineral
resources.  Factors that act to  allevate material scarcity are exploration and discovery  which augment the
reserves,  direct technological  progress in mining  and refining,  general technological  progress  which  leads to more
efficient  processes,  and substitution  which  is often the result of process innovations  in the downstream  industry
and progress in new materiEs technolrgy. Further, as economies  mature the intensity of material utilization
declines  because of the increasing  share of services in the economic  activity. However,  mainly  because of the
expected continuation of strong investment  in plant and equipment in Japan, the United States and Western
Europe, real prices of key metals and petroleum  are expected  to begin to rise in the first half of the 1990s. The
projected  growth in apparent consumption  for some key  minerals and their real prices are reported in Table 10.
The projected  growth  rates of demand  for all the minerals  shown  in the table are quite small  relative
to the trend values since 1960. The supply analyses  for these minerals indicates  that, for the projection period,
it is urlikely that there will be sustained supply bottlenecks due either to exhaustion  of reserves or sharp
escalation  in extraction  costs.
The concept  of reserves  is a dynamic  one depending  as it does on the current level of technological
knowlc,d  and the incentive  regime which  influences  exploration  and R&D activity. Thus the supply  of natural
resources is a Lunction  inter  alia of the policy  environment  assumed in the projection  reported, and therefore
subject to a large margin of error.64
TABLE  10.  ProjeCted  Growth  In Apparent Consumption,  and Trends In Real Prie  of
Selected  Commoditdes  (percent  change  per annum)
Apparent Consumption
Real Price  (Nomin
Developing  Countdes  Industrial  Countdies  price deflated  by MUV)  a/
Trend  Projenions  Trend  Projections  Trend  Projections
1961-86  1990s  196186  1990s  196186  1990s
Remned  Copper  7.0  3.7  1.8  1.4  -2.2  -1.7
Tm Metal  IA  0.7  .09  -25  -1.6  IA
Nickel  Metad  6.2  3.7  3.0  0.9  -2.1  .4.5
PuazyAluminum  11.1  3.3  4.4  15  -1A  -1.6
kon Ore  74  31  1.2  0.5  4A  40.6
Lead Metal  5.6  2.1  1A  0A  .2.0  40.4
Zinc Metal  i-7  3.1  1.1  0.5  -0.4  -0.1
Petroleum  5.8  2.6  2.7  0.9  35  33
MM=e  Compiled  fom ICCM, (The  World  Bank),  VoL H,
November  1988,  and Revision  of Commodity  Price Forecas,  September  1989.
a/ Dollar nominated  pices deflated  by the  Manufatres  Unit Value index  for  the industrial  coutfies,  also
denominated  in dollar  terms.65
4.  DEVELOPMENT  FOCUS: INVESTMENT,  TECHNOLOGICAL  PROGRESS  AND
LONG-TERM  GROWTI
41  The Main  ssues
The rate of growth  of per capita income  in the long-run  is chiefly  determined  by the change  in labor productivity,
which in turn is a function of the growth of the capital to labor ratio and the rate of increase in total-factor
productivity,  which itself is heavily influenced by technological  advance."  Given the major advances in
knowledge  that have  been made during  the last two  decades,  scientific  and technological  progress and its diffusion
are expected  to play a prominent role in productivity  growth in the leading industrial  countries in the next 10 to
15 years.  Although  it is difficult  to estimate with any degree of precision the impact of technological  progress
on the growth prospects  of the world economy  to the year 2000,  it is certain that the net effect will  be positive
and significant.  The key question is how and why  this effect  might  vary  across differeat countries,  industrial  and
developing,  during the next decade.
An improvement  in total-factor  productivity  is thought  to capture  several  effects  including  technology
and efficiency  in resource allocation. However,  over the longer  tenn, total-factor productivity  is usually  taken
as a measure of technological  progress.  Given the sharp recovery  of investment  in machinery  and equipment
in a number of industrial  countries on the one hand, and the existing  empirical evidence on the longer-term
relationship  between technological  progress, investment  and productivity  growth on the other, the outlook for
the industrial economies  in the 19Ms is fairly optimistic  (Table 11).
For thz industrial countries as a group, the rate of growth of total-factor productivity  declined
steadily  during tire pas  tweuty years, from an average  of 2.8 percent per year in the 1960s  to only  0.6 percent
per year in l979-86. This secular decline  was clearly  reflected  in the sharp drop in the labor productivity  from
S/  Assuming  an aggregata  production function  with constant returns to scale, the rate of growth of labor
productivity  (output per man-hours) is equal to the total factor productivity  growth (a proxy  for technological
progress) plus rate of growth of capital to labor ratio times the share of capital in national income, minus the
change in hours of work per worker. The difference  between  per capita output growth and the economy-wide
labor-productivity  growth lies in the difference between population growth and  the growth of labor force
(working-age  population times the participation  rate), where the latter is adjusted for employment  and change
in hours.  For a presentation of the key issues concerning  long-term  growth, see Stanley Fischer, "Economic
Growth and Economic  Policy," in V. Corbo, et. al., (ea),  Growth-Oded AdjufneuntPArwn,  IMF and The
World Bank, 198.  For a historical assessment of the major determinants of long-term growth see Angus
Maddison,  Phases  of Capitaist  Deveopment,  Oxford  Unversity Press, 1982.TABLE  11.  Gross Domestc Capital Formaiion  In Selected  Country Groups, 19601990
Short-term  Outlook  yOiniation)  Ratio of Invstment
Trend  Recent Expeiene  1989  V90  to GDP (Consant  Prices)
1960-1987  1980-87  1987  1988 a/  EEC  IEP  OECD  OECD  1965  1980  1985  1988  a/
Industrl  Countries  b/  prcent  change per annum  - prcentage
Europe  (Wesen)  2.8  13  4.8  8.5  6.9  7.0  75  - 245  23.1  20.0  2LO
Rtw  Germany  1.6  0.4  2.2  5.9  7.7  8.5  93  6.0  26.8  23.5  19.9  215
Japan  6.9  4.0  103  13.4  9.8  9.4  11.1  6.5  29.8  32.3  30.  35.5
United States  3.1  5.0  2.6  5.8  2.3  2.2  3.6  5.1  18.7  16.0  17.7  17.8
Developing  Counties  c/  IBRDd/
Sample of 87 countnies  6.6  3A  5.5  12.8  2.0  19.8  26.6  25.6  273
o/vw LOw  income  8.6  9.9  6.0  20.1  -13  17.9  25.  319  352  CB
Middle-income  52  -1.5  5.0  4.8  6.0  21.0  27.0  213  21A
otw  NEs  (Asia)  IOA  5.2  19.0  14.6  8.6  21.2  343  285  30.8
Memo Itea:
Higbhly debe  countries e/  4.2  -5.0  3A  1.5  5.2  19.7  25.3  17.6  17.6
Sub-Saharan  Africa  3.7  84  -11.1  6S  25  13.6  2  14.0  12.4
Sg=  IECAP Divsion,  Iieinational  Economics Department;  OECD,  Dec.1989;  OECD  Natlona  lInme  WA  nn  IM
Qugloo&  April 1989; Commission of the European  Fitn: ic  F  te  9  SeptemberOctober,  1989.
al  Estmate based  on partil  data for develog  countries.
b/  For idustrial  countries, growth rates  are those of gross.o  minestmen.
el  See Annex B for the list of the 87 otries.
d/  Forecat
e/  17 Highly indebted countries;  see Annex B for list of countries in this group.67
an average of 4.2 percent per year in the 1980s  to only  1.4 percent in 1980-86  (Table 12).X/ This phenomenon,
which  was observed  in nearly  all major industrial  countries,  is thought  to be attributable  to transitory  factors,  such
as the energy  crisis, and longer-term factors such as a slowing  down of the "catch up"  (with the productivity
leader) effects-J, a rapid growth of the services  sector (which  usualy has a low  productivity),  and a considerable
increase in the size of the public sector (which is thought to be less efficient  and productive than the private
sector).  Also, it is important to note that the phenomenon  of faling productivity  was, up to the mid-1980s,
strongly  associated  with the substantial  slowdown  in business investment  in the industrial  countries in the 1970s
and early 1980s;  in nearly all major industrial  countries, the rate of growth of factor intensity  (capital to labor
ratio) declined  significantly  during this period. Moreover,  it has been observed  that there is a systematic  positive
relation between the rates of increase of capital intensity  and the rates of growth of labor productivity,  across
industrial  countries during  periods of growth  boom./  This supports  the so-called  embodiment  hypothesis,  which
states that technical  progress  is mainly  embc Ried  in the new investment  goods. This point is discussed  in Section
43 below.
The potential  of currently  available  advanced  technological  and scientific  findings  holds  considerable
promise for future non-inflationary  growth. The experience  of the 1980's  suggests  that the existing  economic  and
social  conditions  in most industrial  countries,  and perhaps  some of the leading  developing  countries,  would  permit
a rapid diffusion  of new innovations.P  Therefore,  given the projected decline in the growth of population  and
labor force in most of the industrial countries and a continuation  of the secular decline in working  hours per
worker in these countries on the one hand, and the abundance  of new and currently  under-utilized  technologies
on the other, the decade of the 1990s  is likely  to witness a continuation  of the current rebound in investment
19  For an analysis  of the causes  of productivity  slowdown  in the industrial  countries,  see J.W. Kendrick  (ed.),
Intemational Compasons  of Productivity  and Causes  of the Slowdown, BaUinger  Publishing Co., 1984;  Assar
Lindbeck,  "The Recent Slowdown  of Productivity  Growth," Economicnournal,  VoL  93,  March 1983;  and R.C.O.
Mathews,  Slower  Growth  in Western  World,  Heinemann,  [982.
0  See C. Adams, P. Fenton and F. Larsen, "Potential Output in Major Industrial Countries," in IMF Staff
Studies, 1987.
pli  Moses Abramovitz, "Notes on Postwar Productivity  Growth," Center for Economic Policy Research,
Stanford University,  Publication  No. 156,  March 1989.
0  For a summary of the major implications  of the new technologies  in the OECD area see:  OECD, New
Technologies  in the 1990s:  A Socio-economic  Strateg, Paris, 1988. Also  see the study  by C. Freeman (1987)  cited
earlier.68
rates  as these  countrieS  replace  the older  vintages  of capital  goods,  renovate  their  infrastructure,  and introduce
automation  on a much  wider  scale.
L contraSt to the buoyancy  of business  investment  in most industrial  countries, as discussed  in
Section  2, the experience  in many  developing  countries  in the recent  yea  has been disappoiting  and uneven
(see Table 11  and Charts  11-fl). The investment-output  ratio has continued  to decline  in many  of the poorer
countries,  mainly  in Sub-Saharan  Africa,  and remains  quite  low  in most  of the heavily  indebted  middle-income
countries,  concentrated  mainly  Latin America. On the other hand, private  investment,  particularly  in the
export  sectors,  has continued  to rise rapidly  in a number  of countries  with a large  manufacturing  base,  such  as
Korea,  Malaysia,  Taiwan  (China),  and Thailand.
Chart  11
Investment  Ratlos:  Selected  Developing  Countries  and Groups  (1965-8)
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Since  the 1960s,  within  the developing-country  group,  the export-oriented  countries  have  enjoyed
a much  faster  rate  of growth  of labor  productivity  and totaw-factor  productivi than  the developing  countries  that69
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Chart 13
Investment  Ratios: Selcted  High Income Countrbis (19654)




30  /  Developing  countries
/  (87-country  sample)
20  -
1965  1967  1969  1971  1973  1975  1977  1979  1981  1983  1985  1987
Source:  OECD,  IEC.70
had been following  import-substitution  strategies. For example,  according  to the estimates for the period 1960-
73,  labor productivity  of Korea (which  had already embarked upon a strategy  of export-led  growth)  grew at more
than twice  the rate for Argentina and India (which  were not following  export-oriented  strategies).W 1 More recent
estimates (for the period 1973-86)  show that while labor productivity  (measured here by GDP per  person
employed)  rose a. a rate of 4.7 percent per year in Korea and 4.2 percent per year in Taiwan,  it, in fact, fell in
Argentina, and rose by only 1.0  percent per year in Brazil.OI This growing  divergence  of productivity  growth is
the main cause for the emergence of the "two development  tracks" discussed in Section 2.  Because of the
continuation  of substantial differences  in investment efforts within the developing  countries in the 1980s,  it is
likely  that the existing  divergence  in the growth patterns will continue in the 1990s.
4.2  Determinants of Long-Term  Growth
According  to neoclassical  theory, economic  growth is accounted  for by increases in factors of production (labor
and capital) and technical  change. The rate of growth of outk.ut  would  decline over the long run unless  there
is technological  progress, which the theory assumes  to be exogenously  determined.W However, as discussed
earlier, there is increasing evidence that some of the assumptions of the neoclassical  model (for example,
disembodied  technical  change  and constant returns to scale) do not hold in general, for industrial  or developing
countries. Indeed,  several recent empirical  studies  have found  that a number of variables  usually  ignored in the
neoclassical  analysis  - principally,  export performance,  the size of the public sector, human capital investment,
and demographic factors - have a crucial role to play in explaining  the long-term growth performance of
developing  countries.'
2V  See Moshe Syrquin, "Productivity  Growth and Factor Reallocation," in H. Chenery, S. Robinson, M.
Syrquin,  (eds.), Industriizaion  and Growth,  Oxford University  Press, 1987.
W  Agnus Maddison,  7he World  Economy in the 20th  Cenawy,  OECD, 1989.
J  Robert Solow,  "A Contribution  to the Theory  of Economic  Growth", QurterlyJoumalofEconomics, VoL
70, 1956. For a review  of determinants of long-term growth of industrial  countries, see A. Boltho, "Can We
Return to Rapid Growth?" The World  Bank, PPR Working  Paper 9, June 1988;  and IECAP, "Can the Industrial
Countries  Return to Rapid Growth?" The World Bank, PPR Working  Paper 209,  August 1989.
/  See I. Otani and D. Villanueva,  "Long-Term Growth  in Developing  Countries  and Its Determinants: An
Empirical  Analysis,", IMF, (Processed),  1989; Robert J. Berro,  "A Cross-Country Study of Growth, Saving, and
Government," NBER Working  Paper No. 2855,  February  1989;  and William  R. Easterly and DeboraL  L Wetzel,
uPolicy  Determinants of Growth," The World Bank, PPR Discussion  Paper No. 343, December 1989.71
The background  empirical  work prepared for this paper, '-sed  on cross-section regressions  (for
example,  see Table Sb above),  tends to support the results of other recent studies  concerning  the impact of key
variables on longer-term per capita income growth of developing  countries, namely that:  (a) export effort
(growth) has a strong and positive  effect; (b) investment  effort, which  tends to be positively  correlated with  the
export effort, also has a significant  and positive  effect; (c) high rate of population  growth  has a negative  effect;
(d) high external debt burden, a proxy for a history of internal and external imbalances,  has a negative  effect;
and (e) high  inflation, also a proxy  for poor domestic  policies,  has a negative effect.
In addition, other studies have  found that domestic  savings  (as a percent of GDP) and government
spending  on education,  a proxy  for investment  in "human capital", have  positive  and significant  effects  on long-
term per capita income growth, while the size of public  sector (that is, government  consumption  spending as a
percent of GDP) has a significant  negative  effect. Although  there seems to be a general agreement on the list
of relevant variables,  there is need for further empirical  work in this area.
43  The Embodiment  Hypothesis
The embodiment hypohesi  states that new capital equipment and machinery embody the most advanced
technology. Thus, new investment is the main channel through which  new technology  can be acquired. Based
on recent empirical  work, capital investment,  together with the embodied technology,  has been responsible  for
nearly two-thirds  of postwar  economic  growth in the major industrial  countries. Technological  progress alone
is estimated to account for about a third of the postwar growth.fW  Although most economists  have usually
assumed disembodied  technical  progress in their research, there is an increasing  body of empirical  results that
shows that capital investments  embody technical change. These results also show that investment in turn is
influenced  by technological  progress.AV  Often, new scientific  achievements  and technological  innovations  are
ff-I  Estimates obtained from growth accounting for the contribution of the various sources of growth are
vulnerable to differences  in methods of estimation  and concept used.  For example, the contribution of total
factor productivity  to average growth of output in the United States for the period 1948-79  as estimated by
Denison  (E. Denison, Trends  inAAmencan  Economic  Growt, 1929-82,  Washington,  D.C.,  The Brookings  Institute,
1985) is fifty percent higher than that by Jorgensen (Dale Jorgensen, et.al., Productiviy and U.S. Economic
Growth,  Harvard University  Press, 1987).
9  In general, the embodiment assumption  raises substantially  the impact of capital accumulation  on output
growth.  For example, Solow  has shown that under a certain set of assumptions  the impact of investment  on
output growth  is twice  as large if embodied technical  progress is assumed  (R. Solow,  "Investment and Technical
Progress," in KI  Arrow, et al., (eds.) Mathematical  Methods in the Social Sciences,  Stanford University  Press,
!  ~~1960.72
a major  incentive  to invest.  Since  a major  channel  through  which  firms  can increase  efficiency  and productivity
is installation  of the  most  recent  vintages  of capital  goods  emboding  new  technology,  a higher  rate of investment
generally  results  in a higher  rate of total-factor  productivity.P/  In addition,  better management,  more  skilled
work  force,  and innovative  production  schemes  can  raise  the efficiency  of resource  use,  and thus  increase  total-
factor  productivity.
Recent statistical  results  strongly  support  the embodiment  hypothesis. For most of the larger
industrial  economies,  the correlations  between  the growth  of total  factor  productivity  and the growth  of capital
are strongly  positive.  Also  the correlation  between  the growth  of total-factor  productivity  and the growth  of
capital-labor  ratio is positive  and even  stronger.  Z  These  findings  suggest  that the technology-embodiment
effect  in the industrial  countries  has  been strongly  influenced  by  capital  deepening.
Fzgures  in Table 12 show  that, for the industrial  countries,  historically  there has been a close
relationship  between  the overall  output  growth  and  the  rate of  growth  of  total-factor  productivity.  Partly  because
of a widespread  rise in business  profits  and the rise in the rates  of return  in business  sector  and partly  because
of a faster  growth  of output  and falling  real prices  of raw materials  in the early  1980s,  investment  rates  have
increased  in a number  of industrial  countries  in the later half of the 1980s. The significant  acceleration  in
investment  growth  in these  counties, as weil  as in the Asian  NIEs,  seems  to have  resulted  in a pickup  in the
growth  of total-factor  productivity  in the same  period  in comparison  to that in the late 1970s  and early 960so
4.4  ne  Convergence  Hypothesis
As discussed  above,  investment  in machinery  and equipment,  through  the technology-embodiment  effect,  raises
labor  productivity  over  and above  the rise due to the capital-deepening  effect. Related  to this phenomenon  is
the socalled convewnce  )othysu,  which  asserts  that over the long run labor productvity  (and per capita
income  levels)  of the relatively  less  developed  countries  may  converge  (or "catch  up") to the levels  of the more
advanced  industrial  countries.  It is usuaUy  assumed  that the more  advanced  country  (or countries)  is also the
f  Growth  in total factor  productivity  is defined  as output  growth  minus  factor  input  growth,  where  the latter
is defined  as a weighted  average  of capital  and labor  inputs. Many  researchers  equate  total  fctor productivity
as that portion  of output  growth  that is due to technological  progress.  An increase  in the level  of total factor
productivity  is tantamount  to an inward  shift  in the capital-labor  isoquant.
I  This  result  in support  of the embodiment  hypothesis  is due to Edward  N. Wolff,  "Capital  Formation  and
Productivity  Convsrgence  Over  the  Long  Term,"  New  York  University,  January  1988  (processed);  and  A.  Steven
Eqglander  and Axel  Mittelstadt,  "Total Factor  Productivty: Macroeconomic  and Strucal  Aspects  of the
Slowdown,"  OECD  Economic  SPtude,  No. 10,  Spring .98873
TABLE  12.  Factor Productivity  and Output Growtb
In  the  Blib  InEcome OECD  Counrtries,  19601990
Longer.Tenm
Trend  Historical  Averages
1960s  to 1987  Pre-1973  a/  1973-79  1979486  1986&90  b/
percentchangeperannum
h  IncomeOECDCountries
Real  ODP  3.9  S2  2.9  2.4  33
Productivity
ToWl  c/  1.7  2.8  0.7  0.6  12
Labor  2.9  42  1.6  1A  1.9
Capital  -0.9  .0A  -1.4  .13  .0.6
&UM  Based  on  o  jca  o  varous Issues.
a/  For  nme  countries  in the group the starting  year is either 1960  or 1961,
b/  Forecast  for 1989990.
ec Total factor productivty is equal to real output grwth minus growth of factor inputs, which is a weighted
index  of capital  and iabor  inputs.
TABLE 12a.  Convergnce  of Productivity levels
Among Mador Hih  Income OECD Countries,  1968-1984
Rate of Growth  of Total  Economy-wide  Labor
Factor Productivity  Labor Productivity  in Manufacturing  Productivity  Reiative  to US.
minus that of US  Relatie  to U.S. (U.S. = 100)  (US.  - 100)
1960.73  1979.86  1968  1973  1979  1984  1950  1973  1986
(percentage)
Japan  4.6  1.7  342  46.9  602  68.6  13.0  40.0  51.0
Germany  13  03  62.2  65.2  743  69.7  29.0  64.0  79.0
France  2.8  13  65.1  72.4  865  81.9  38.0  67.0  89.0
United Kingdom  0.5  1.1  S8.7  59.1  57.6  57.8  S4.0  64.0  7S.0
Italy  3.2  0.7  S9.1  63.0  69.7  67.2  33.0  66.0  74.0
E,=  Callatd  or drectly taken from  Tables 1,3 and 11  in A.  Steven Englander  and Axel Mittlestadt,  "Total Factor Pductivity-
Macconomic  and Stuctural  Apecs  of the Slowdow  in QCD&MMS  No. 10, Spring 1988,  pp. 7-57; and A.
Maddison,  =T_e  W  d Eon  the  OECD.  1989.
*  GDP per man4hour.74
leader in technology  and that its "followers" implem,'nt an appropriate set of policies  tending to facilitate  the
"catch up.'!
The less advanced  countries,  therefore, have the potential  to make sizable  productivity  gains,  given
the initial  wide  gap between  the levels  of labor  productivity.  Thus, according  to this hypothesis,  the less advanced
countries are expected to grow at a faster rate than the leading country. As shown in Table 12a,  there was a
rapid convergence  of productivity  levels  of the major industrial countries toward that of the United States, in
the manufacturing  sector, as well as others, in the 1960s  and the early 1970s. The "catch up" hypothesis  has
been used to explain both the higher growth rates of Europe and Japan  relative to the United States (the
technology  leader) in the postwar era and the slowdown  in their growth in the 1970s  and 1980s. For example,
according to estimates for the manufacturing  sector, the pace of convergence  among the industrial countries
slowed down measurably  in the 1980s  (Table 12a). Presumably  the reason for the slowdown  is the gradual
reduction  in the scope  for "catch up" as the technological  frontiers of the "followers"  draw closer  to that of the
leader.
The empirical  evidence  in support of the convergence  hypothesis  is fairly  strong.W Recent evidence
shows that convergence  has taken place in all major industries  in the manufacturing  sector, across industrial
countries. Furthermore, the productivity  convergence  is estimated to be stronger for all manufacturing  than
for individual  industries,  possibly  implying  that different  countries have  a marginal  technological  lead in different
industries.W
The convergence, though, is by no means automatic, particularly for many of the developing
countries. Because  of a significant  slowdown  in their rate of capital accumulation,  the productivity  gap between
them and the high-income  group has actually  widened in the 1980s.
The convergence  hypotheses  has two major implications  of relevance  to the 1990s. First, as shown
in Table 12a, significant  technological  gains on this account have already been made by the major industrial
ZI  See WJ. Baumol, "Productivity  Growth, Convergence,  and Welfare: What the Long Run Data Show,"
American Economic Review,  Vol. 76, 1986  and works by Wolff (1988) and Englander and Mittelstadt (1988)
cited earlier. However,  some doubts have  been raised about the convergence  hypothesis  by Romer (Paul Romer,
"Capital Accumulation in the Theory of Long Run Growth," Working Paper No. 123, Rochester Center for
Economic  Research, 1988),  who argues that most empirical  studies  in this area have left out important factors,
such as accumulation  of skills  and education,  from their calculations  and have  therefore overestimated  the effect
of technical  progress and physical  capital accumulation.
2J  D. Dollar and E. Wolff",  Convergence  of Industry  Labor Productivity  Among  Advanced  Economies,  1963-
1982,"  Review  of Economics and Stai5tics, November 1988,  pp. 549-558.75
countries. But as labor  productivity  in manufacturing  in the major  industrial  countries  converges  toward  that
of the United  States,  it will  become  more difficult  for these  countries  to improve  upon their current  level  of
productivity  just by imitating  the ufroder." In all likelihood,  new  leaders  will  emerge  in specific  fields.  But the
individual  countries  will  have  to raise  their R&D  spending  in target aeas in order to accelerate  their pace  of
teclhnical  progress,  more  or less  independently  of the "leader." This  development,  however,  puts  the developing
countries  at a disadvantage,  since  for most  of them  it will  become  increasingly  difficult  to enter and compete  in
the international  market  which  is already  becoming  dominated  by  high-technology  manufactures.  Foreign  direct
investment  will assume  an increasingly  important  role in the transfer  of new technology  from the leading
economies  to the developing  countries.  With  the exception  of the NIEs,  the existing  overall  productivity  gap
between  the  developing  countries  and  the  industrial  countries,  which  remains  as wide  today  as it was  in the 1950s,
is not likely  to diminish  in the 1990s.
Second,  the convergence  of productvity  levels  of the major  industrial  countries  during  the postwar
period  came  about  mainly  because  of the  trade-liberalization  measures  that led  to the removal  of  the major  trade
barriers. This facilitated  the transfer  of technology  among  the industrial  countries  - mainly  from the United
States  to Europe  and Japan. In this context,  the success  of the Uruguay  Round  of negotiations  and a rollback
of the protectionist  policies  of the industrial  countries  is of critical  importance  to the developing  countries'
prospects  of improving  their  productivity  levels  through  the embodiment  and catching-up  effects  in the 1990s.
In sum,  a development  strategy  informed  by  the  above  analysis  would  be for  the  developing  countries
to focus  on accelerating  their rate of productivity  growth  over the next  decade. To do so they  would  have  to
mobilize  domestic  savings  and investment,  reduce government  consumption,  and encourage  foreign  direct
investment.  Development  of human  capital  and improvement  of management  quality  will  also be important
factors  in this endeavor.76
S.  PRJECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS  FOR  TRENDS  To 2000
The  baseline  and an alternative  (low case")  scenario  are presented  in Tables  13-16  below In constructing  the
baseline,  an attempt  has  been  made  to calibrate  the projections  to reflect  the major  characteristics  of the global
economy  in the 1990s  as they  are perceived  in 1989.
S1  Assompdons  of the Baseline
The key assumptions  in the baseline  (that is, the "adjustment  with growth"  scenario  already  referred  to in
Section  3.1  above),  such  as oil and non-oil  commodity  prices,  key  exchange  rates,  and interest  rates,  are based
on the current  judgement  of the Bank  staff,  using  a variety  of econometric  models.  The  projections  for the oil
and non-oil  commodity  prices  are  based on simulations  of individual  commodity  models,  using  an initial  set of
assumptions  for manufactures  exports  unit values  (MUVs)  and GDP  growth  rates of the industrial  countries.
The  key  assumption  concerning  the macroeconomic  policies  of the  industrial  countries  centers  on the US. fiscal
policy.  In the baseline  it is assumed  that the United  States  will  reduce  its fiscal  deficit  gradually  in the next  few
years,  mainly  through  reductions  in military  spending  and modest  increases  in taxes.  The  deficit  is not assumed
strictly  to meet  the  targets  set by  the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  Budget  Act (a balanced  budget  by 1992-93),  but
to fall  significanty  so as to amount  to less than  2 percent  of the nominal  GDP by 1993  and reach  the balance
before  the end of the decade.
It is also assumed  that the main  objective  of monetary  policy  in aU  major  industrial  economies  will
remain  that of continued  downward  pressure  on infation,  but that,  in the  face  of more  restrictive  fiscal  policies,
it wil not have  to play  a leading  role in generating  deflationary  tendencies.  Monetary  and fiscal  policies  in
Europe  wiU  accommodate  a relatively  high  rate of growth  in view  of their  market  unification  project. Japan's
macroeconomic  policy  is also  assumed  to be accommodative,  allowing  a strong  growth  of domestic  demand.
The baseline  projections  for developing  countries  are based on the recent (as of mid-1989)
judgments  of the Bankes  country  economists,  using  a uniform  set of global  assumptions  for commodity  prices,
exchange  rates,  interest  rates  and output  growth  rates  in the industrial  countries.  The  individual  country  results
are then  calibrated  using  a world  trade  modeL  The  baseline  projections  to the  year  2000  are  summaized  below
and the main assumptions  are shown  in Table 13. The commodity  price,  exchange  rate and interest rate
assumptions  are shown  in Charts  14-17.77
TABLE  13. Ass.mptIons for International Economic  Environment
Facing  the Developing  Cotntries In the 1990s
(urente  ch&anne  VW  anum)
AssumpIons for the
Trend"  Recent Eperience"  1990 b/
196S587  1980-87  198Sa/  Baseline  Low Case
HIgh Incone OECD  Countries
Rea GDP  33  2.6  4.0  3.0  2.4
Inflation  c/  5.6  4.8  2.8  4.0  4.4
Manufactures  Unit Values  (S)  6.2  32  8.3  3.9  S.0
Real rate of interest d/  3.1  5.7  4.7  2.7  3.8
Nominal  rate of inteen  87  10.5  81  78  9.6
Low  and Middle  Income Countries e4
Expot value (S)  10.0  42  17.0  11.0  9.7
volume  S.0  5.6  10.1  55  4.2
Realpriceofoilf/  6.2  -4.0  -255  35  3.0
Real price of 33 nonoil commodities  fl  3.5  4.0  11.0  0.6  0.0
a  IECAP  Division,  International  Eaowmics  Department.  Based  on Poliy Assumptions
Committre  (PAC) memo dated Octoberll10/1988  and the Unified Survey  1988R9.  The Bare cas  scenario
assumes  aduption of policies  (by the major industrial) which duces structural rdidies  and imbalances
and allows  for healthy  economic  gowth in the 1990s.  The "Low  case" seenario  assumes  that some needed
policy  changes  are not made,  interest rates reman high, there is more inflation,  growth Ottens  and there is
mor  protectonism.
a/  Prelminaestimate.
b/ Based  on  projections  Sy ECAP  (dated  03/26R/9).
c/  GDP deflator, in local  currency  terms,  weighted  by  dollar denominated  GDP in current prices.
d/  LIBOR,  6-month  dotIr  de<sit, adjusted  by US GDP deflator.
e/ 90.cotintlysample.
fl  Commodity  prices deflated  by dollar unit  value of manufactures  of the 0-S countries.
"snelnote  All average  growth  rates reported in Tables 1316 are compound  annual  rates of change
calulated using the beginning  and ending years of the indicated  intervaL These rates sometimes differ
substantially from  trends esdmated with the  ordinary least  squzes  method used  in  the  Wt2z1
nn,R=78
Chart 14
Nominal Effective  Exchange  Rates of Major Currencies
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Chart  15
Exchange  Rates  of Major  Currencies
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Chart 16
Nominal  and Real Interest Rates
(Six-month  USS  UBOR  and the same  adjusted  by US  GDP  deflator)
Per  cent
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.2  The Salient Features of the Baslne  Projections
The industrial  countries are expected  to maintain  an average real GDP growth of about 3 percent
in the 1990s,  which is somewhat  higher than the average in the 1980s. It is assumed  that the favorable  effects
of the new technological  revolution  on labor productivity  will begin to be more clearly  observed in the second
half of the 1990s, particularly in Europe and Japan - since they have been  undergoing major stuctural
adjustments. With the industrialW-country  population  growth  slowing  down  to 0.4  percent per annum,  the resuling
average growth  of per capita GDP for these countries  will be about 2.6 percent per annum, which  is faster than
that experienced  any time since  the early 1970s  but is still  in line  with their long-term trend. Per capita income
growth in North  America and Western Europe will  be similar, at about 2.5 percent per annum, though  Europe,
because of ?Proect  1992,  is expected  to grow  somewhat  faster in the mid-1990s.  Japan's per capita  income growth
will  be abou  t a percentage  point higher  than the other two  areas. Inflation  rates in the major industrial  countries
are expectzd  to remain moderate, in the range of 2-5 per ent per annum,  and at a somewhat  lower average  rate
in the second  half of the decade. This is because  of the assumed favorable  supply-side  effects that would  result
from the major investmient  drive and retooling  in the manufacturing  industries  in the earlier part of the decade.
7knw
Prices of manufactures in local currency  terms are expected to rise at a slower  pace in the 1990s
as a result of greater international  competition,  particularly  in the second  half of the period. Implications  of the
Uruguay Rounds of trade negotiations and the effects of the expected widespread introduction of newer
technologies  in the production  processes  could ;lay important roles in keeping prices of manufactures  in check.
Prices of fuel and non-fuel commodities,  which  have  fallen significantly  in real terms in the 19 80s, may  begin to
rise in the 1990s, at a pace moderately  faster than that of the manufactures  prices (Table 13). Needless  to say,
there is a considerable  degree of uncertainty  about these projected trends.
D  gmlpbWCmmin
The baseline  projections  for the developing  countries  present a mixed  picture  for the L990s Despite
a relatiwely  optimistic  outlook  for the industrial  countries,  the economic  situation in some parts of the developing
regions is expcted  to remain weak, particularly  in the early part of the 1990s,  as the process of trade-and-
payments  adjustment in the industrial  countries continues to unfod, and as the assumed continuaton of large81
negative  transfer  of resources  impedes  growth  by keeping  the level  of investment  depressed  in many  developing
countries. However,  a number  of countries  that were low performers  in the 1980s  but are assumed  to be
sucessful  in implementing  the needed  policy  reforms  (that  is,  countries  successfl  in reducing  budgetary  deficits,
improvng  incentives  to prvate investment,  building  up domestic  confidence,  reforming  and restructuring  the
trade  sector,  and privatizing  public  sector  enterprises),  are  projected  to increase  their  per capita  income  growth
significantly  by the mid-1990s.  On the other hand,  some of the highly  indebted  countries  are projected  to
continue  to face relatively  low  economic  growth  in the I99Qs. Unless  these countries  pare down  their fiscal
deficits  substantially,  raise  the level  of  domestic  savings,  attract  foreign  capital,  and reduce  the  level  of their  debt
service,  they  would  continue  to suffer  a deterioration  in their standard  of living.
Although  the average  annual  rate of growth  of per capita  income  of the highly  indebted  countries
is expected  to accelerate  to about  1.5  percent  in the 1990s  (a reversal  from an average  of -13 percent  per year
in 1980487),  their  economic  and  social  situation  is expected  to remain  delicate  over  the next  few  years. Even  the
1.5  percent  annual  growth  in per capita  income  is based  on an optimistic  assumption  of a gradual  decline  in the
ratio of debt service  to export  and a resumption  of positive  financial  transfers  to these  countries  after  the mid-
1990s.
The  per capita  income  of China,  India,  and  the  Asian  NIEs  are expected  to continue  to grow  at rates
significantly  above  the average  for the developing  countries.  And,  in all likelihood,  the process  of "graduation"
will  continue  as,  by  the year  2000,  most  of the current  NIEs  will  have  joined  the ranks  of the  industrial  countries
and several  other developing  economies  will  have  become  the new  members  of the NIE group.
On the other  hand,  the economic  situation  in many  poor  countries  in Africa  will  remain  precarious.
The average  per capita  income  in Sub4s iaran  Africa  is expected  to grow  by less  than 1 percent  per annum  in
the 1990s,  albeit  at a somewhat  higher  rate in the later half  of the 1990s.  This  would  indicate  that even  by the
I  year  2000,  average  per capita  income  of the region  will  be less  than  in the mid-1960s.  However,  the projections
also  show  that,  as a result  of  major  structural  improvements  in their  economies  during  the later  part  of the L980s,
some  of the  African  countries  are  expected  to improve  their  economic  performance  considerably,  relative  to the
prevaing conditions  in the L970s  and 1980s.
53  A Low-Case  Scenario  and Quantificaton  of Risks
Some  of the key  assumptions  of the baseline  scenario,  such  as the decline  in interest  rates  in the 1990s,  critically
depend  on a timely  change  in the  macroeconomic  policies  of the  major  industrial  countries  that  were  responsible82
for the emergence  of external payments  disequilibria  and the high real interest rates in the 1980s. As discussed
in Section  3.1, the core of the required policy  changes  concerns the U.S. fiscal  deficit. A major violation  of the
baseline assumptions  would be for the U.S. fiscal  and current account deficits  to remain large indefinitely. In
that case, as the external financing  of the current account deficit becomes increasingly  difficult,  real interest
rates in the United States would have to remain high, while the dollar would continue to weaken, and these
developments  would  tend to exacerbate  the inflationary  pressures  in the United States. The so-called  "low case"
scenario (reported in Tables 13-16)  depicts these circumstances  whercby  a combination  of low growth and high
interest rates in the industrial  countries  tends to retard economic  growth  elsewhere  and thus complicate  the task
of economic  development.
Under this scenario, the average  growth of per capita real income in the low- and middle- income
countries  in the 1990s  could fall  significantly  below their trend rate in the last twenty  years. The highly  indebted
countries will be particularly  affected by the higher real international interest rates.  Nevertheless,  the higher
inflation in the industrial  countries and the lower value of the dodlar,  under this alternative scenario, partially
protect those developing  countries that do not face variable interest rates on their external debts - mainly  the
ODA recipients and some commodity  exporters (assuming  that the aid flows rise in dolar terms under the low
case scenario).  This observation  may explain why,  under the low case scenario, the growth rates of the low-
income countries  are not much affected  while  those of the heavily  indebted countries  fall  substantially  below  their
long-term trend average (Tables 14 and 15).  The Asian NIEs could lose about 1 percentage point in their
expected average growth rate for the 1990s,  mainly  because of the slowdown  in international  trade.  Their real
per capita income growth,  however,  is likely  to remain well above the average for the developing  countries.
CAPew
The above exercise  quantifies  only  the impact of a deterioration in the external environment  faced
by the developing  countries; the calculations  do not reflect the impact of any policy  response  by the developing
countries to the change in the international  economy. Moreover, the "low case" scenario assumes that the
various risks faced by the developing  countries,  such as a failure of domestic  policies and a deterioration in the
external economic  environment,  are not compounded,  as might  well be the case. Furthermore, the "low case"
scenario does not consider the possibity  of a deep global financial  crisis (for example, the "hard landing"
scenario in Section 3.1 above). Quantification  of such risks and their impact on the developing  countries as a83
group is both difficult and highly  speculative;  for different countries would  be affected differently and, hence
would  respond differently.
However,  the experience  of the 1970s  and 1980s  has proven  that countbies  that take the appropriate
measures and adjust quickdy  tu the changes  in their external environment  tend to fair much better than those that
postpone the needed policy  measures. According  to one set of estimates,  the latter group  of countries  could see
the growth rate of their export volume decline significantly  - perhaps by as much as 2 to 3 percentage points
more than the adjusting  countries - under the "low case" scenario  as compared to the baseline average. Such
a decline  in exports could result in a significantly  lower  growth than indicated  by the aggregate  figures  in Tables
13-16.
5.4  Options for Improved Performance
The international  options for improved  performance  in the world  economy  are limited  and are complex  in nature.
First, it should be recognized that  there  is only a  nimited  room for further improvement in the  growth
performance  of the industrial  countries. Barring  any unforeseen  adverse shock,  al  major industrial  economies,
with the exception  of the United States, are expected  to grow at or near their potential in the next few years.
This is the main outcome  of the baseline  scenario,  one that makes it a fairly  optimistic  scenario  for the industrial
countries. Thus, a significantly  bigher  growth acceleration  than in the baseline  would  only  mean higher inflation
and higher nominal interest rates.  Given the experience  of the 1980s,  a higher rate of output growth in the
industrial  countries accompanied  by a higher level of international  interest rates could have an adverse impact
on the heavily indebted developing  countries. Therefore, the best feasible option as far as the international
xonomic environment  is concerned,  is a continuation  of the robust growth in the industrial countries,  but at
relatively  low  and stable international  real interest rates, along -ith liberal  trading policies  toward  the developing
countries,  and generaly stable exchange  rates among the key currencies.
Second, given the experience of the 1980s, faster growth in the industrial countries does not
necessarily  lead to a higher  growth  in all developing  countries. Many  deve;oping  countries  have  been "bypassed"
during  the latest resurgence  in the world trade, in the period 1986-88.Z/ This  development  is due in part to the
domestic supply constraints in many indWivuur  developing countries, brought about by many years of low
investments  and poor policies,  and in part to the high level of external debt which drains more of the needed
foreign exchange  whenever  interest rates  ise.
/  Shahrokh Fardoust and Ashok Dhareshwar (1989),  cited earlier.84
Therefore,  given  the main  issues  highalghted  in this  report,  there are only  a few  viable  options  that
may  lead to a significantly  better economic  performance  in the developing  countries  in the 1990s: (a)  an
intensification  of the ongoing  international  efforts  to resolve  the external  debt problem  of the developing
counties;  (b) a menu  of domestic  policy  changes  in the developing  countries  to reform  trade  policy,  to mobilize
domestic  financial  resources,  and to remove  the  existing  structural  rigidities  and supply-side,  constraint;  and (c)
policy  measures,  within  the  GATr framework  and  the  Mufibre Arrangement,  to further  open  up the  industrial-
country  markets  for manufactured  products  from the developing  countries  and to alow easier and cheaper
transfer  of technology  from the industrial  countries  to the developing  countries.
Debt Redm  Sei
Some  preiminy  work  has been  done  to implement  simulations  concerning  strategy  toward  debt
and the results  are reported  here.W The mami  assumptions  of the debt-reduction  scenarios  implemented  are
in line  with the proposed  Brady  'ian for the highly  indebted  developing  countries. This plan envisions  a 20
percent  reduction  in the level  of private  debt  outstanding  and the associated  service  payments  over  a three  year
period. The main  conclusion  of this scenario  is that the impact  of the plan on the GDP growth  of the high,
indebted  countries  will  be quite  modest  if they  are not allowed  to increase  the level  of their current  account
deficits  relative  to the baseline. The reason  is that some  of these  countries  already  have  arrears  approaching,
or even  exceeding,  the amount  of the expected  debt  relief  implied  by  the plan. Specificaly,  under  this  scenario,
the aggregate  GDP  of these  countries  could  rise by about  1.2  percent,  over  the  baseline  projection,  by the third
year of the plan,  amounting  to an average  increase  of less than half a percent  per year. If, the scenario  is
augmented,  however,  by  allowing  an increase  in the level  of capital  flowv (from  a variety  of international  sources
and/or through  repatriation  of domestic  residents'  wealth  held abroad)  so as to substantiay reduce  the net
negative  transfer  of resources  of the debtor  counties, the results  become  much  more robust. Under the
augmented  scenario,  the aggregte level  of real GDP  couh rise  by about  5 percent  over a three  year  period  in
comparison  to the level  in the baseline,  an increase  of about  1.4  percent  per year.W
W  These  scenarios  were prepared  by IECAP  for the World  Developnt  Aepo  1989 which  contains  a
summa.y of the results (pp. 21-22).
Y  Assuming  an inflow  of capital  c' about  $22  billion  per year.
b/  Robert  Lynn,  "Interpretations  of the Brady  Plan," LPCAP,  1989  (processed).85
As dscussed  earlier,  foreigp  direct  invstment,  as a non-debt-creating  flow,  could  play  a cntical  role
in financing  the investment  needs  of the developing  countries  in the 1990s.  A preliminary  set of estimates  of
the impact  of a large  increase  in the level  of such  flons on the developing  economies  is very  encouraging.  For
example,  a $20 bilion per year increase  in the level  of foreign  direct investment  flow  into the developing
counis  (which  is roughly  twice  the level  assumed  in the baseline  projections  presented  earlier)  could,  after
five  years,  result  in a 10 percent  increase  in the level  of real gross  domestic  investment,  a 12  percent  increase
in the level  of real imports,  and a 3 percent  increase  in the level  of real domestic  absorption.  The total  level  of
external  debt  would  stay  constant,  while  the debt-to-export  ratio  would  tend to decline  somewhat.  The impact
on industrial  countries  is also  found  to be positive  and  significant.  Because  of an increase  in the level  of exports,
their real GDP level  would  be 1 percent  higher  than the baseline  by  the fifth  year  of the simulation.z
ZU  This  scenario  was  implemented  by A. Jamshidi  (IECAP),  using  the IMFs Multimod  Model.86
TABLE  14.  Real GDP Growth  Rates for Low  and Middle Income  Countries, 1965-2000
(percent change  per annum)  *
GDP  Population  Recent
(bil.  of S)  (millons)  Trend  Experience  Proections for 19906
1987  1987  1965.87  198048  Baseline  Low Case
AU  Low and Middle  Income  Countries  2663  389  53  42  5.0  4.2
By Bank Regions
Sub-Saharan  Afiica  137  442  3.2  0.5  3.8  3.7
excLuding Nieria  121  335  3.1  2.1 
Asia  1025  2590  6.6  7A  6.3  5.5
ofwhichNIEsa/  230  70  9.0  8.0  6.9  S.8
EMENA b/  754  390  4.6  2.8  3.9  3.3
latin America  & Canbbean  721  404  4.6  1.  3.9  3.0
By Dank Income Groups
LOWIncme  818  2822  S.8  65  6.4  5.6
Middle  Income  1879  1038  5.0  2.9  4.5  3.7
Memo lten,*
Allow  and Middle  Income  minus  China  2215  1996  4.9  2.6  4.3  3.6
and India
Highly  Indebted Countries  878  582  4A  1.1  3.9  3.0
High Income  OECD Countries  12348  747  33  2.7  3.0  2.4
Source: IUCAP  Division,  Intemational  Eonmics Department. See  Table 13  for explanation  of the scenanos.
a/  Includes Korea,  Taiwan  (China) and high  income  countries  Hong  Kong  and Singapom
b/  Europe, Middle  East, and North Afica, Pakistan  is induded.
All average  growth rates are compound annual rates of change calculated  using the beginning  and ending years of the indicated
interval. These rates sometimes  differ substantially  from trends estimated with the ordinary least squares method used in the WrQzI87
TABLE  15.  Real GDP Per Capita Growth  Rates and Their Relative  size,  1965-2000
(average  annual percent change)  *
Per Capita  Per Capita Income
Income  Recent  Ptvections al  Relative  to
(in USS)  Trend  Eaperience  Baseline  Low  s  OECD Average b/
1987  196S-87  1980488  1990s  1987  2000
(percentage)
Low  and Middle  Income  Countries  690  3.0  2.1  3.1  2.4  4.8  5.7
Excluding  China  and India  1110  2.4  0.2  2.0  1A  8.2  7.8
ohw Asian NIs  c/  3285  6.9  6.5  55  4.3  22A  30.0
Hi*gy Indebted  1510  2.1  -1.2  1.6  0.9  9.8  8.9
Sub-Saharan  Africa  310  OS  .2.6  0.7  0.6  2.2  1.8
High  Income  OECD Countries  16S30  2.6  2.2  2.6  2.0  100  100
Population
Memo Items  Relative  to OECD
Population  growth  (percentage)
LowandMiddlelncomcCountuies  . 2.2  2.0  1.8  1.8  520  594
High Income  OECD Countries  ...  0.8  0.6  0.4  OA  100  100
Souc:  IECAP Division, International  Economics  Department.
a/  JECAP  projections  (0326/89),  see notes to Table 13 for explanation  of the scenarios.
b/  Assuming average gowth  of GDP and population as in the baseline scenario.  Disparities  among countries (in 1987) may be
exaggerated  since purcasing power parity  conversion  factors (as in ICP)  are nLutilized here.
c/  Includes Korea,  Taiwan  (China) and high income  counties Hong  Kong  and Singapore.
I  All average gwth  rates  are compound annual rates  of change calculated  using the beginning  and ending years of the indicated
intervaL These rates sometimes  differ substantially  from trends estimated vith the ordinay  least squares method used in the Wh(gr!d
2m~~  . n  BID=.  ....  .88
TABLE  16.  Key  Financdal  and Trade  Indicators,  19732000
(Oeceunt  and percent change)
Histozy  Aveage in 1990s  a/
1973-80  1980.8  1988  Baseline
Loou*tenm  Debt Service  to  Eqorts  Ratlo
Low  and Midde Icome Counties  14.7  20.0  23.6  16.3
o1w  Hgh  Indebted  26.0  35.0  32.0  30.0
Sub-Sabaan  Africa  6.6  19.0  19.2  27.0
Net  T1sf  ts  Flotnilal Re.ss  (on
accon  ofdebt) to Esports bi
Lowand Middle  Income  Countres  8.0  -5  6.  -2.8
ow  HighlyIndebted  10.0  -175  -16.0  .11.5
SubSahbamn  Africa  12.0  3.0  3.5  -4.5  c/
ImportVolumeGrowth
Low  and Middle,  Iome  Countries  6.0  22  115  5.9
o0w  Higbly  Indebted  SS  -4.4  8.0  S5.
Sub-SaharanAfrica  75  0  403  3.1
SmuL  ItCAP Division, lnrnational Eonomcs Department.
a  .CAPP  Proections  (03/2489);  see  notes  toTable  13  forelanatin  of the scenari
bl  RPto of net bng-term  disbursemets  (exduding  grants)  minus  inarest  payments  to eport  of goods  and
serices  in 1980,1988  and 1995,  rpectvely.  Inters  payments  and amoriaion  in pretion  perd  are on
an accual  basis  (ie, no  rescheduling  or stock  reduction  is  assmued).
c/  Assumes  no debt stock  reduction  or private  and.  dl relschedulinp  for the hWh indebtd  contries in
the zegi  Net transfes are assumed  to stay positive  for all countries  other than the highy indebted
counties  in  the region.89
6.  CONCLUDING  NOTL The  Challenge  for Development  PoUcy
At the  broad level  of global  anabsis,  there are good  reasons  to be optimistic  about  the 1990s.  Fast, there are
favorable  supply-side  developments  in many  of  the  high-income  countries.  If there  are no major  policy  mistakes,
and if the international  financial  markets  remain  reasonably  stable,  the remarkable  rebound  in investment  rates
observed  dunng  the past few  years  should  promote  a period  of relatively  ramd  and non-inflationay  growth  in
these  countries.  Second,  considerable  scope  exists  for a recovery  of priva&t  consumption  and investment  in the
debt-stricken  developing  countries,  as well  as in Eastern  Europe  and the USSR.
Nevertheless,  for the developing  countries,  global  economic  forces  will  continue  to drive  a wedge
between  the successful  manufacturing  powerhouses  of today,  which  have  strong  trade and investment  linkages
to the major  global  growth  poles,  and  the rest. Introduction  of new  technologies  in the production  process  may
continue  to favor  the fast-growing  econom.es,  as a new  generation  of machinery  and automation  may  continue
to lessen  the comparative  advantage  enjoyed  by the "low-wage  countries." The substantial  differences  in
investment  rates  of the  1980s  between  the  higher-income  and  other  developing  countries  will,  if not  reversed,  tend
to widen  the technological  gap between  them. A major  improvement  in the domestic  policies  of the poorer
countries,  along  with  a significant  increase  in the level  of foreign  financing  through  direct  investment  and other
channels,  could  halt a further  widening  of  the  gap and  prove  to be a major  stabilizing  force  ;n the  world  economy
in the decade  ahead.
As the decade  of the 1980s  comes  to a close,  policymakers  and development  specialists  must take
stock  of boJah  the  failures  and successes  in the development  process.  The  development  strategies  pursued  in the
last  two  dec%des  "ve  had a mixed  record.  Since  the  mid-1970s,  the process  of economic  development  has  been
severely  interrupted  in a large number  of developing  countries  in part because  of several  upheavals  in the
international  economy.  But the  experience  of the 1980s  generally  adds  weight  to the  view  that  the key  to success
in economic  development  is the domestic  policies  of the developing  countries  themselves.  In particular,  the
countries  that  followed  a prudent  mix  of macroeconomic  policy,  implemented  structural  reforms  on a sustainable
basis through  liberalizing  policies,  oriented  their economies  toward  international  trade, took advantage  of
technical  and scientific  progress  through  continued  investments  in physical  and human  capital,  pursued  a more
equitble distribution  of income,  and relied more on domestic  savings  for financing  investment  have ofen
su"ewssfuil  in building  more  adaptable  and resilient  economies.  Such  efforts  would  have  to be intensified  in the
1990s  becuse the challenges  te the  development  of the poorer  countries  are, if anythin&  more  dauntin&90
In many  poorer countries,  a relatively  minor  adjustment  of domestic  policies,  at the rininmum  an
avoidance  of policy  mistakes,  could  lead to an extra  0.5  to 1 percentage  point  real income  growth  per year,  and
over a period  of two  to three decades,  that marginal  addition  to the growth  rate would,  through  the power  of
compounding,  translate,  into a 20 to 30 percent  increase  in the standard  of living. Therefore,  in order to
substantially  reduce  poverty  in the developing  countries  over the two  decades,  it is imperative  to sustain  the
growth  process  even  in the face of an inhospitable  international  environment.  Even among  many  of the so-
called  -high performers"  of the 1980s,  large  segments  of the population  still  remain  in absolute  poverty. If
incomne  growth  in these  countries,  particularly  China  and India,  remains  significantly  above  population  growth
for another  ten  to fifteen  years,  the number  of poor  in the world  will  be reduced  substantially.  A more  equitable
distribution  of  income  should  allow  the  fruits  of growth  and  prosperity  to reach  the lower  income  groups  in these
countries. It is worth noting  that the "high-performing"  countries  of the 1980s  have  relatively  more equal
distribution  of income  than  many  of the other  developing  countries.
The main  development  challenge  for the 19590s  wilL  therefore,  center  on the desperate  economic
situation  of a large number  of countries  that were the "low performers"  of the l980s,  countries  unable  to
introduce  flexibility  and  resilience  into  their  economies.  In a number  of these  countries  the developmental  gains
of the 1960s  and 1970s,  which  in some  cases  reflected  inherently  transitory  factors,  have  been  partially  or even
entirely  reversed  in the 1980s  as governments  were forced  to cut social  welfare  and educational  spending Yet
military  budgets  in many  of these  countries  have  rarely  been  reduced  to achieve  needed  economies.  In some
instances,  the social  and politi--!  fabric  of the society  has come under  great strain. If the situation  is not
reversed,  these  countries  will  add much  to the number  of poor  in the world  in the 1990s  - as they  have  in the
1980s.
Experience  of the 1970s  and 1980s  shows  that  when  there  is no coherent  developmeut  strategy  and
when  the domestic  macroeconomic  situation  is in disarray,  the growth  process  tends  to collapse  in the face  of
a sharp  deterioration  in the international  economic  environment.  When  there  are frequent  policy  mistakes  and
a general  lack  of direction  in policy,  every  shock,  internal  or external,  breaks  down  crinfidence;  capital  tends  to
flow  out of  the country-,  investment  falters;  and recoveries  are  weak  and  short-lived.  In contrast,  high-performing
countries  have  been much  less  vulnerable  to external  shocks,  sustaining  as they  did investment  and productive
efficiency  despite  advers international  conditions. Therefore,  what may be  Aquired  in most low-growth
countries  is policy  action  to stabilize  macroeconomic  conditions  so as to revive  confidence,  thus  raising  private
investment  and accelerating  productivity  growth. Obviously,  in most  instances  these  measures  have  a better91
chance of success  if they are buttressed by external financial  support for a long enough period of time to allow
the domestic  economic  conditions  to revive,
The major bottleneck  for a sustainable  non-inflationary  growth in the low-performing  countries is
low or even  falling  labor productivity  and inefficiency  in the use of factors of production. Reforms in trade and
finance sectors and a reduction of existing  barriers to industrial competition  could promote a more efficient
allocation  of resources  and a higher level  of investment  productiAty. For the smaller countries,  which make up
the bulk of the low-performers,  diverting  resources  to their trade sector is the best way to enhance productivity
growth. Thus, assuming  that many developing  countries will introduce  the needed reforms, a crucial factor in
their economic  outlook in the 1990s  will be the roll back of the existing  protectionist  policies in the industrial
countries  against the exports of developing  countries. The outcome  of the Uruguay  Round of negotiations  and
Europe 1992  will be critical  to the developing  countries.
While a  country is implementing economic reforms and is opening up  its  economy to  the
international market-place, it is important to shield the domestic economy as much as possible from major
external shocks,  such as a precipitous  adverse  change in commodity  prices or interest rates.  Such a protection
can take the form of various  compensatory  financing  schemes  as well  as financial  hedging  instruments  being made
accessible  to the country  through,  for example,  a policy-reform-and-adjustment  package  with  international  lending
institutions. It appears that, thus far, only a few, and for the most part large, countries undergoing major
economic  reforms have been able to take advantage  of such schemes. The issue needs to be considered  on a
much wider scale, particularly for the smaller and weaker countries that constitute the bulk of the  "low
performers" in the 1980s. The disadvantages  of smallness  of sca'e may call for even more attention to the
adequacy  of the policy  framework  than is typically  the case for larger countries.
This paper has attempted to shed some light on the major development  issues facing  the low- and
middle-in.iome  countries in the 1990s  by identifying  the major linkages  between  adequacy  of financial  resources,
capital formation, access to new technology,  and international  competitiveness.  Any set of projections  should
embody a view  on how these linkages  are likely  to work out in the period ahead. The task of development  is
expected  to become  even  more challenging  in the next  decade  because  environmental  problems  and demographic
constraints  are becoming  more serious, thus limiting  future policy  options. Moreover,  developing  countries will
be facing  new challenges  in the 1990s  as they compete with the Eastern European countries and the USSR  for
limited supplies  of international  capitaL The resurgence  of Europe and the growing  dominance  of the NIEs in
manufacturing  trade add further weight  to the conclusion  that retrogression  in many developing  countries can
only be combated by cultivating  greatly  increased  vitality  in them.92
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ANNEX  A
Some  Empiical Evidence  for the Two-Development-Tracks  Hypothesis
L  A detaRed  analss  of the so-called  Two Development-Tracks  hypothesis  is reported  elsewhere.l/
Some  of the key  findings  are reported  below.
2.  In order to determine  which  countries  within  the low  and middle  income  group  did "perform  well"  in
the 1980s,  the folowing  statstical  screening  was  performed
(a)  "High  performers  were  identified  as those  countries  whose  performance  satisfied  the following
oonditions~  they  had an average  per capita  income  rgrowth  of 2.0  percent  or more  in 1980-88
n were  also  able to raise  or maintain  an investment  to GDP  ratio equal  or greater than  the
avage for the  group  in the 1980s.  A total of only  13 counties out of a sample  of 87 satisfied
these conditions.
(b)  'Low  performers  were  identified  as  those  countries  whose  performance  did  not  satisfy  the  above
conditions  (Le.,  they  had faling or stagant growth  n4  disappointing  investment  performance
in the 1980s).  A total of 48 countries  out of a sample  of 87 satisfied  these  conditions.
3.  The  overa characteristics  of the two  groups  is reported  in Table  AL Low  performing  countries  in the
190s on average  tend  to oe middle  income  with  a relatively  small  populationL
4.  Table  A2 summarizes  the major  characteristics  of each  group. As tke data in the table  indicates,  the
growth and investmeui  performance  of the two groups  began to diverge  more significantly  in the 1980s.
Moreovr, sveal  key economic  characteristcs  of the two groups  are markely different  from one another.
Compared  to the H'§* performers  the Low  performers  on average  have  higher  external  debt  burden,  lower
manufacturing  base,  less  open  economy,  lower  manufacturing  exports  to output  ratio,  higher  population  growth
and less  productive  ivestment.
TABLE  A.1 Bado  Chamaots  of  "Hgh PerfomoersW
and !Low  Perfonner In 11987-8
Popultaton  Real  GDP  Real  GOP  Average  Population  inflalion
Number  of  In 198?  In  1987  Per  Capia  In 1987  Per  Country  Pate  In 1987
Counties  (MlNons) Qii.  of 1980$)  (1900$)  (Millions)  (percent)
High  Perome  13  2054  1129  547  159  5.3
Low  Pmers  48  1005  1087  1081  21  36.1
,/  S FardoUSt  andA  Dhareshwar,  'A  EnE  caEnquiy  Into SomeAspects ofthee  Developmenhic
HMwdotha'  powe4  JIEC4P,  World  Bwk  Aups  1989ANNEX  A
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TABLE A.2  Key Economic  Indicators for the High and Low  Performers
(all fgures are averages  and are In percent
unless noted otherwise)
AJI  Low  and
Hlgh  Low  Middle  Countries
Performers  fome  Sample  of 87  Countries
GDP  Growth
1965-73  6.2  5.8  6.0
1973-80  5.4  4.8  5.1
1980-88  7.6  1.3  4.0
1980-88  (unwelghted)  6.0  1.4  2.4
1989-2000  3/  6.1  3.7  4.8
1982000  (unwelghted)  4.6  3.4  3.7
Investment  Ratio
1973.80  27.4  22.9  25.5
190-Q8  31.7  16.7  24.0
Implied  Inverse  ICOR
1980-88  0.239  0.077  0.161
Populatlon  Growth
1965-73  2.5  2.6  2.5
1980-88  1.6  2.6  2.0
Extermal  Debt
Debt/GDP  Ratio  (1987)  21  54  38
Debt/Exports  Ratio  (1987)  79  318  168
Exports/GDP  Ratio  (1987)  26.1  17.0  22.4
Unwelghted  (1987)  52.3  25.1  32.7
Manufactures  Exports
to total  Exports  (1987)  73.1  32.4  56.4
Unwelghted  (1987)  56.1  26.0  32.2
Outpuit  %WGUEur
Manufactures  Value
Added  to GDP  Ratio  (1986)  30.2  19.1  22.4
/  WDR  '89 baseline.AM=  B
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Annex  B: Country  ClassNtcatlon
Table  BI:Low- and MIddle-Income  Member Countries
Sub-Sabaran Afria  Asia  EMENA  Lain  America
East Africa  West  Africa  East Asia  South Asia  and Caribbean
Large  _China  India  __
Burundi  Benin  Indonesia  Bangladesh  Yemen, PDR  Guyana
Ethiopia  Burlina Faso  Myanmar  Haiti
Kenya  CensralAfr. Rep.  Nepal
Lesotho  Gambia  Pakistan




Low  Sudan  Niger
Income  Thuzania  Nigeria-
Uganda  Sierra Leone
Zaire  obgo
Zambia
Comoros  Chad  Kampuchea  Bhutan  Afghanistan
Not  Mozambique  Eq. Guinea  Kiribati  Maldives
Included In  Guinea  Lao
87-Country  Guinea Bismau  Solomon Islands
Sample  Sao lbme &  Vanuatu
_____  _________  Principe  vietnam
Botswana  Cameroon  Fiji  Algeria  Argentina
Mauritius  Congo  Koreab  Cyprus  Barbados
Seychelles  C6te d'lvoire-  Malaysiab  Egypt  Boliviaa
South AfricaM Gabon  Papua New  Greece  Brazild
Zimbabwe  Senegal  Guinea  Jordan  Chile&
Philippines 0 Malta  Colombiaa
.Tiwan, Chinab  Moroccoa  Costa Rica'
l  Thiland  b  Portugal  Dominican Rep.
Syria  Ecuador'
Tunisia  El Salvador
Turkey  Guatemala







T}inidad  & Tobago
Uruguay'
Venezuela'
Djibouti  Cape Verde  Macao  Hungary  Belize
Swaziland  Tonga  Iran  Dominica
Not  Western  Samoa  t,.aq  Grenada  -
Included in  Lebanon  St Christopher
87.Country  Libya  & Nevis
Sample  Oman  St Lucia
Poland  St Vincent &
Romania  Grenadines
Suriname
'These  17 countries make up the group of Highly Indebted Countries (HICs).
b These four economies (Korea, Malays"a,  Taiwan (China), and Thailand), with Hong Kong and Singapore (which  are shown in
Table B2), form the group of Asian Newly Industrialiing  Economies  (NIEs).
cNot  part of Sub-Saharan Africa regional group.ANE  B
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Table  W2:  HIgh-Inoom.  Countrl* and  MNon  wnbw No  n-Reporting  Count,Ies
North Awaeu  Ads  _  _  _  .
and  Padt  'ies
Canad&d  AuiMila  Aubia
United Stats  Japae  Begium
New Zealad  Deanmak
F-
Fed. Rep. of Germany
HIgh.nacome  lodnd




United  Kingdom 0
Andgua & Barbuda  Hong gave  Bahrain
Bahamn  SlgPor  Brunei
Other  Benmuda  Israd
High.Income  Nethrland  Kuwait




Cuba  VcM  Dem. Rep.  A.bna  Angola
Non.Member  4  fot  Bulgaria  Namibia
Non.Reporng 
Countries  Ceman  Dem. Rep.
USSR
a  These  countis,  along with  Gea,  Pbrtua4l,  and  lrkey  ampprie  the OECD  counti
b Group name used by the  lMF.
c  The C5  countries.
d G-5 plus these countries nu6ie  up the G-7.
See note b of ibl  B  1.ANNEX  C
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AmezC
Per  Capta  Income  Charts  Baued  an Pnn Wald Tale Estmtes
Charts  depicting  the  movements  of real  GDP  per  capita  for  vaious countries  and country  groups  using  estimates
from the PWT4 (Penn  World Table (Mark 4)) are presented  here. These charts  (Cl, C2, and C3) are
counterparts  of Charts  3, 4, and  6 in the tetL
The  charts  are  based  on the  RGDPi  (real  gross  doestic  product  per capita,  in 1980  international  prices)
and  POP (popuation)  time  series  in the DATA  TABLE  diskettes  supplied  with  Summers  and Heston  (19).
The DATA  TABLE  includes  a set of international  compari  for 121  market economies  and nie  centrally
planned  economies  over  the priod l9505.  The  group  of developing  countries  m the annex  charts  consists  of
85 counties made  up of the 87-country  sample  used  for the  tet  charts  (see Table BD)  minus  Seychelles  and
Peoples  Democratic  Republc of YemeLANNEX  C
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Chart Cl:  Relative  GDP Per Capita:  High Income and Developing Countries (196S-85)
(PWT4  estimates;  1965  US  GDP  per  person  - 100)
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Chart C2: Relatve GOP  Per Capia: Developing  Countries (196585)
(PWT4  esfimates; 1965  US  GDP  per person  - 100)
Index  (1965  US  GDP  per  capita=100)
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Chart CS
Per  capna GDP  Growth  of High-  and Low-Penorsom
Amng te  Developing  Countes: PWT4  EsUmaeos
Annual percentage  change
H*igb'  Performers
10 
i.-\.  ^OECD countries
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'Lovw Performers
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Note:  "I  Performers:  smple of 13 developing  countries;  'Lowo  Performers:  sample  of 48 developing
counties. Se  footnote  to Table  6 in the texL
Source:  Summers  and Hsston  (1988).PRE  Working  Paoor  Series
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